1) Rawl's argues in his Idea of Public Reason that one can not appeal to religious, philosophical, or economic theories when discussing constitutional essentials and materials of basic justice (pages 224-5). How is this possible when, as individuals, we all appeal to some sort of "higher truth" in order to justify our political views?
2) Building on the above questions: If one is required to appeal to Public Reason in order to justify their beliefs, there is a possibility that their argument is now weaker than when it was formulated in private used "higher truths". Due to this compromise Rawls insists must be made, it would now not stand against an opposing view that was originally formulated using Public Reason. doesn't this kind of constraint on public reason severly limit public discourse to the extent where one could say it is "unfair"?
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