Minimal Models of Consciousness (030102-WiSe22/23)

Despite much progress in the science of consciousness, the field is far from finding a consensus on even fundamental questions and problems. This can be seen by considering how many competing theories of consciousness there are, and how difficult it is to test and empirically compare them.
On the one hand, a plausible reaction to this situation is to try and make theories more specific and to derive empirically testable predictions that can differentiate between theories of consciousness.
On the other hand, the need to determine whether non-human animals (and, potentially, artificial systems) are conscious, seems to require more general, minimalist approaches, that abstract away from the specific neuronal mechanisms underlying consciousness in human beings.
In this seminar, we will first gain an overview over major theoretical approaches in the science of consciousness. Then we will investigate how to taxonomise minimalist approaches and how to assess their specific virtues. Finally, we will explore ways in which the relationship between minimal models and theories of consciousness can be conceived: are they independent, complementary, or in opposition?

Literatur:
Birch, J. (2022). The search for invertebrate consciousness. Noûs, 56(1), 133–153. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12351
Metzinger, T. (2020). Minimal phenomenal experience. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(I), 1–44. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.46
Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022). Theories of consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4
Wiese, W. (2020). The science of consciousness does not need another theory, it needs a minimal unifying model. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2020(1), niaa013. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niaa013