On Compromise (030079-WiSe19/20)

One common feature of today’s debates in liberal societies is their growing moralization, e.g. with regard to migration or climate change. This means that political demands are justified by moral principles, which entails a rejection of opposing claims as principally wrong. Although a result of freedom of expression, it often is argued that this kind of public discourse has the potential to endanger social cohesion, peace and thereby liberal democracies themselves. By holding moral neutrality in high esteem, liberal societies are in need of political compromise to overcome these principled divisions. However, with its focus on justice and basic institutions, the traditional literature on political liberalism did not analyze the notion of political compromise in depth.

This seminar, therefore, will look at the recently growing body of literature on the concept of political compromise. It aims at elaborating if and how the idea of political compromise can be justified and how to differentiate between “good” and “bad” compromises. Moreover, it will be asked if and how a hierarchy of political values like peace, stability and justice should be applied to public issues. Could there be good reasons to forestall advancements in justice for the sake of long-term social peace and stability? If so, how can social progress and justice be aligned with the notion of political compromise? Finally, who are the agents of political compromise and are there rights, duties or political virtues connected to this essential political concept?