1. “However, while it may be true that political morality will have some distinctive features which distinguish it from personal morality, the claim that political actions are not (or cannot be?) subject to moral appraisal seems so obviously mistaken that I shall ignore it.” (p. 144 1st paragraph). Why is it sufficient only to say that a polity implies political obligation because the people are members of it?
2. “If such thoughts and feelings are shown to be morally intelligible in the context of a shared identity, constituted by membership of a particular polity, why is more necessary? If such thoughts and feelings are shown to be morally intelligible in the context of a shared identity, constituted by membership of a particular polity, why is more necessary?” (p. 155 1st paragraph). But then the question is, where does this obligation come from? Is it determined; or we must always we have to take it for granted because otherwise we would not have any satisfactory answer for any justifications?
3. “They will claim that what my account shows is (at best) that people have certain 'institutional' or 'positional' obligations by virtue of their membership of a polity, but it does not follow that these are morally binding.” (p. 155 2nd paragraph). Is it what he is trying to say that we take moral principles into account only when it comes for the society to obey particular law or order instead of the concept of “political obligation” itself?