Most theories of justice start from a positive definition of the latter concept. However, there are good reasons for choosing the opposite path, that is, for starting from a definition of injustice and from a denunciation of its most evident phenomena. This would allow, so the idea, for reaching consent on unjust situations and deeds even in the absence of consent on what constitutes justice. This strategy is particularly adopted by authors who focus on the question of collective responsibility for actions carried out in the name of a collective body (a society, a state etc.). In the first part of the seminar, we will first discuss the methodological option of starting from injustice instead of justice. We will focus particularly on Judith Shklar’s attempt at defining different forms of injustice. In the second part of the seminar, we will discuss some relevant forms of injustice: historical and colonial injustice, structural and social injustice, oppression and domination, epistemic, testimonial and hermeneutic injustice.

Semester: WT 2023/24