This seminar gives a systematic introduction to propositional attitudes. The latter
are mental states like beliefs and desires that are typically ascribed through sentences of the form a Vs [= believes/wishes/. . .] that p. Part I of the seminar is dedicated
to the empirical properties of propositional attitude reports (e.g. their referential
opacity, possible non-specificity, lack of existential import) and to the (de dicto/de
re-)ambiguity of attitude ascriptions that is brought about by these properties.
Part II introduces Hintikka’s classical relational account of these properties. This
account analyzes propositional attitudes as relations to a proposition [= to a set
of possible worlds]. Part III identifies challenges for Hintikka's account that arise
from (i) its relational character, (ii) the coarse-grainedness of ‘possible world'-style
propositions, and (iii) the uniform treatment of diverse attitudes. Time permitting,
we will discuss some recent answers to these challenges.
- Kursleiter/in: Kristina Liefke