



'Cultural Shift': The case of Jewish religious education in Israel

Shmuel Shamai

To cite this article: Shmuel Shamai (2000) 'Cultural Shift': The case of Jewish religious education in Israel, British Journal of Sociology of Education, 21:3, 401-417, DOI: [10.1080/713655352](https://doi.org/10.1080/713655352)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/713655352>



Published online: 28 Jun 2010.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 203



View related articles [↗](#)



Citing articles: 1 View citing articles [↗](#)



'Cultural Shift': the case of Jewish religious education in Israel

SHMUEL SHAMAI, *Golan Research Institute & Tel-Hai Academic College, Israel*

ABSTRACT *This study explores the unique situation of the Israeli-Jewish education system in Israel, which has developed different educational streams mainly according to religious differences. It highlights the changes in the status of the cultural stands of secular and religious Jewish groups in the course of the twentieth century. The secular majority has been willing to fund separate autonomous religious schools. Remarkably, the lower state intervention in the schools, the higher the level of funding. Thus, the ultra-orthodox schools have enjoyed full funding together with the greatest autonomy. Moreover, the nonautonomous secular state schools have also practiced religious rituals, without any clear guidance by the Ministry of Education and Culture. The implications of full autonomy and funding of the ultra-orthodox schools is discussed, by way of 'critical sociology of education', with emphasis on the 'cultural shift', the cultural advance of the religious groups, and 'cultural surrender' of the secular group.*

Introduction

To examine the history and situation of Jewish religious education, studies, and religious instruction in Israel, this paper applies educational theories. The theory of the critical sociology of education is brought to bear. Few attempts have been made to use of these theories on a practical level. The efforts of Mallea (1989) and Shamai (1990) are unique in this respect, and serve as models for this paper. Based mainly on conflict theories, the study emphasizes power and control relationships, and tries to discover the ways in which schools operate in terms of whom they benefit and whom they fail. This approach uses the conflict theory terminology of subordinate/dominant groups, and contrasts it with consensus theories. Therefore, as may be expected, many of its concepts are based on and defined according to class-oriented situations. Early work in critical sociology of education focused on inequality and class. However, in contrast to conflict theory, attention is increasingly being paid to articulations of gender, race, and class (see Corrigan, 1987; Wade *et al.*, 1989).

Critical sociology of education has pointed out that 'Education was not about equality, but inequality ... Education's main purpose of social integration of a class society could be achieved only by preparing most kids for an unequal future, and by ensuring their

personal underdevelopment' (Willis, 1983, p. 110). The unequal future is perpetuated along class, gender, and ethnic lines. Thus, 'schools were stripped of their political innocence and connected to the social and cultural matrix of capitalist rationality' (Giroux, 1983, p. 258).

The key concepts from critical sociology of education that are relevant to this study are 'cultural hegemony', 'hegemonic curriculum', 'cultural capital', and also the 'correspondence principle'. Behind these concepts are four major themes: (1) the contested nature of culture and the state; (2) the reproduction of culture; (3) dominant versus subordinate relations, based on class, gender, and ethnic origins; and (4) the static nature of dominant-subordinate relations. These concepts usually describe a given situation without analyzing the historical context; they focus on the perpetuation of domination in society. This study probes them in a dynamic educational system from a historical perspective. This power of the state manifests itself in cultural hegemony and cultural legitimation. Cultural hegemony is defined as the imposition by the dominant group of its cultural design through its possession of power, while the group's culture is reproduced and distributed by socialization agencies, including school (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Giroux (1981, p. 23) defines cultural hegemony as:

The successful attempt of a dominant class to utilize its control over the resources of the state and civil society, particularly through the use of the mass media and the educational system, to establish its view of the world as all inclusive and universal.

A hegemonic curriculum reflects the values, ideology, and culture of the dominant group in a society (Shamai, 1990), where this group controls the society's cultural and educational system, including the explicit and hidden curriculum. The dominant groups impose their views, beliefs, and culture on the rest of the society, primarily by using the educational system to establish their views. The part of the culture that becomes legitimate by the hegemony of the dominant group creates the cultural (and curriculum) hegemony which overrides the real concerns of large numbers of students who are from subordinate groups (Giroux, 1983, p. 268). The latter are expected to subordinate their own culture to the values of the dominant culture. This paper probes the dominant-subordinate relations in the case of religious minority students in Israel, who, according to the concepts of cultural hegemony and cultural legitimization, would be expected to forget their minority culture and to become secular Jews.

An important concept in the critical sociology of education is cultural capital. Developed by Bourdieu & Passeron (1977) and Basil Bernstein (1971-1977), cultural capital consists of selected sets of values, beliefs, attitudes, and competencies possessed by some students, which are selectively endorsed and transmitted by the school. Thus, society perpetuates itself and reproduces its cultural and social hierarchy for the benefit of the dominant groups. In this study, these terms are probed not from the school's point of view, but from the dominant students' point of view. Critical sociology of education stresses school and state practices.

The state is a site of 'ongoing conflicts among and between various classes, genders, and racial groups' (Giroux, 1983, p. 275). However, the dominant group controls the state, and hence the schools as well. Through economic, cultural, and ideological practices, the state intervenes in the schools and controls the teachers, the parents, and the curriculum. The correspondence principle developed by Bowles & Gintis (1976) states that the social organization of the classroom mirrors the social organization the

workplace. It would seem that society perpetuates itself and reproduces its cultural and social hierarchy, for the benefit of the dominant group.

Public education is controlled by the state, which exercises its power by controlling the school budget and by supervising every aspect of school life: ideology, curriculum, staff hiring, student admission policies, etc. The state is not a neutral entity, and culture is a highly contested and biased entity. The bias benefits the dominant group, as it controls the power of the state. The theory of critical sociology of education emphasizes dominant-subordinate relations, which promote cultural attitudes in favor of the dominant group.

However, the case study explored in this paper manifested the weakness of the dominant group. The power of the religious groups was revealed inside the public-secular school system, and also with respect to the different secular and religious government-sponsored educational streams. **This paper reports a unique situation in which minority groups control national education, and the dominant group yields it power and supports religious schools without demanding any control.** The paper outlines the historical events that led to the current situation, and also presents unpublished material and interviews conducted specially for this study.

The new term developed in this study is 'cultural shift'. It denotes the change from dominance to nondominance or even to subordination. This term manifests the dynamic situation. As culture is permanently contested, it is not surprising that dominance may shift from one group to another, and 'cultural mobility' can take place: upward ('cultural advancement') to a higher place, and downward ('cultural surrender'). The cultural stand of one group is not as stable as it seems from the critical sociology of education literature, but is dynamic, changeable, and temporary.

The Correspondence Principle and the History of Religious Education

To understand Jewish education in Israel, a probe of the history of the debate on Jewish education is needed. Until the First World War, Jewish education in Palestine was controlled by and affiliated to Jewish organizations and communities in the Diaspora. Thus, the debate about the character of education, which dates to the beginnings of Zionism, is relevant for a grasp of the present cleavages in Jewish education, as is the debate about the proper solution for the problem of the Jewish people. This debate went on among both secular and religious Jews. The Jewish people were divided into many factions, each promoting its own solution. In the secular camp, socialist and Marxist ideas prevailed and competed with Zionist ideology[1]. Zionism started as a secular movement and was therefore deemed sacrilegious by the religious leaders of Jewry, who awaited God to lead the Jews to the Holy Land. However, some religious leaders gradually started to accept Zionist ideas. In so doing, they divided the religious orthodox camp into three approaches to Zionism: the Mizrachi group, which gradually joined in; Agudat Israel, which hesitated; and other ultra-orthodox (consisting of many small groups), which rejected Zionism. The issue of control over the new Zionist educational system in Palestine divided the earliest Zionist congresses. The fierce debate focused on whether the Zionist organization should assume responsibility and establish its own educational system in Palestine. Some secular representatives insisted that it was their right to promote a secular Zionist culture, while others were influenced by the opposition to such ideas by the religious groups. Theodor Herzl, the leader of the Zionist movement, postponed taking a decision from one congress to the next. At the first four congresses (from 1897 to 1900) the secular representatives were not successful due to lack

of coordination and organization. However, the situation changed at the fifth Zionist Congress, at which Herzl was unable to block a resolution that called on the Zionist organizations to conduct educational work in the 'national spirit', meaning the secular and not the religious way (Bat-Yehuda, 1986). This decision was taken owing to the establishment of a secular group, the 'Democratic Faction', headed by Chaim Weizmann. They went to the 1901 Congress fully prepared, unlike the religious representatives. They controlled the cultural committee, which tabled a motion in their favor and which was approved by the Congress. The religious representatives' position at the Zionist congresses was that cultural and educational activities should not be dealt with by the Zionist movement, but should be handled by local communities. The religious groups wished to ensure their power over their communities, and they feared secular influence (Bat-Yehuda, 1986). In reaction to this resolution, in 1902, the Mizrahi movement was founded, and the need for religious education was at the heart of its first manifesto (Kiel, 1973). From 1902 onward, the religious representatives pressed for Mizrahi control over religious education. The secular Zionists, who in the same year sought a dialogue with the religious groups, placed the subject on the agenda of the Russian Zionist conference in Minsk. Ahad Ha-Am, a prominent secular Zionist leader, who headed the secular faction, accepted the religious representatives' demands for autonomous religious education. He had two reasons for doing so.

- He was afraid of splitting the Zionist group (Kiel, 1973). Most Jews were not Zionists, and the movement was a relatively small group wishing to expand; it was willing to compromise with religious Jews, in order to encompass pro-Zionist religious groups.
- Ahad Ha-Am's views on Judaism suited such ideas. He preached tolerance between secular and religious Jews. Each side was obliged to accept the other's way of life (Schwied, 1981), so two autonomous educational systems (secular and religious) seemed the logical conclusion.

However, the 1902 Minsk resolution of the Russian Zionists was not approved by the Zionist Congress; nor was it accepted by Mizrahi. They opposed the idea of secular education and any kind of Zionist education. In their 1903 convention, they reversed their earlier support (Shilhav, 1981). At the 1911 Zionist Congress, the secular faction succeeded in having a resolution passed regarding control of Zionist cultural life. A similar debate ensued from the founding of the Department for Hebrew Culture, which was responsible for education and publishing and for the Hebrew Language Academy. Despite fierce opposition by Mizrahi, the secular representatives tabled and pushed through a resolution that gave the secular Zionist organizations monopolistic powers to conduct 'cultural work' in the Land of Israel; however, it had to be carried out without giving offense to religious Jews (Shilhav, 1981).

As a result of the 1911 resolution, a large segment of religious Jews announced their abandonment of the Zionist organization, and they broke away from Mizrahi. In 1912, they formed a new movement, Agudat Israel (Bat-Yehuda, 1986), which rejected any educational support or intervention by the Zionist organization (Kahana, 1969). The first two decades of this century were dominated by the secular majority, culturally and politically. However, this situation gradually changed.

This decision was more theoretical than practical, as Jewish education in Palestine was not controlled by the Zionist groups until 1918. After World War I, the Jewish schools in Palestine were in financial difficulties due to the hard times in Palestine. The Zionist movement took over, financially and pedagogically, most of the Jewish Zionist schools, that were in economic straits. The Zionist movement was the most organized and

economically established group in Palestine (Elboim-Dror, 1990). The fierce clash between the religious and secular groups resumed, the old arguments were repeated, and the idea of autonomous education systems, together with fear of domination of the curriculum by the other side, was emphasized. The labor (socialist) Zionist view, expressed by prominent leaders (Berl Kaznelson and Yosef Luria, the head of Zionist education in 1919) was to protect secular Jewish education from religious influences (Rinot, 1986). At the Zionist Congress in London in 1920, an agreement was reached that assured Mizrahi substantial autonomy over its schools (Bar-Lev, 1991), including control over a seven-member 'Orthodox Supervisory Committee' that had been established. All its members were orthodox, and Mizrahi received full authority over all aspects of the religious schools (Bentwich, 1960). Two pedagogical conditions were attached to the religious schools' autonomy: Hebrew must be the language of instruction; and a certain minimum of general studies (not only religious studies) would be taught (Zameret, 1997). A supervisory committee was also established for general education. Above both (religious and secular) supervisory committees, shared institutions for general administration were created (Bar-Lev, 1991).

After Mizrahi managed to secure its own autonomous education stream, the socialist groups succeeded in securing their own autonomous 'workers' stream in 1923 (Shilhav, 1981). This divided secular education as it split off from the main stream. The latter was labeled the 'general stream', and was nonsegregated, nonsocialist, and secular, loosely affiliated to the centrist General Zionists party (*Ziyonim Klaliyim*). During the British Mandate, three autonomous public-funded Zionist streams of education operated in Palestine: the secular and nonaffiliated general stream; the socialist workers' stream; and the religious Mizrahi stream (Reshef & Dror, 1999). Thus, the 1920 decisions meant abandoning the idea of a common Zionist education for a partly common and a (separate) secular and religious education. That situation signaled a 'structural pluralistic' division. To secure the integrity of the fragile Zionist camp, and to maintain its own ideological (workers') education stream, the secular camp gave up the idea of common (shared) education for all and yielded its status as the dominating force in the Zionist movement. The religious Zionists who were organized managed to achieve autonomous education, and to improve their status from a subordinate group to a group with equal rights to the secular group. This was the first step in a 'cultural shift': the beginning of 'cultural surrender' by the secular group and of 'cultural advancement' by the religious group. However, the situation continued to change.

The money received from the British mandate in Palestine was given to the Zionist organization, which divided it among the three Zionist streams. The British thereby ensured Zionist dominance. Moreover, the British did not intervene pedagogically, but tried to intervene in the organizational aspects of the education. The Zionist streams asked for more money, but were not ready to surrender their autonomy or to introduce any organized change. They received only partial financial support, but won their autonomy (Reshef & Dror, 1999). Interestingly, that pattern of behavior—expecting financial support and retaining educational autonomy—continued after the British mandate until the present day.

The Zionist organizations' stand regarding finances placed Agudat Israel education in a difficult situation. The ultra-orthodox (Agudat Israel) movement was not funded by Zionist bodies because it opposed Zionism. However, in 1947, after the Holocaust in Europe had put an end to any financial support, it wished to become an 'official' educational stream in order to receive full financial backing. In that year, Agudat Israel was denied autonomous status because of its rejection of the pedagogical conditions for

funding religious educational groups (Zameret, 1997). But 1 year later, at the height of Israel's War of Independence, for the sake of the country's survival, the Israeli government relented and recognized the Agudat Israel stream, with hardly any limitations on its autonomy, as the fourth educational stream (Zameret, 1997). It was entitled the 'independent stream', which it indeed was. This time, the secular camp not only gave up the idea of common education for all, but it gave up even the minimal limitation on the autonomy that it demanded from all state-funded educational streams. This was the next step in the 'cultural shift': totally abandoning the idea of a common Zionist education. At that time, the secular ideology was still alive in the 'workers stream', which was growing, and the Agudat Israel stream was struggling for survival, so the risk of conceding to the ultra-orthodox did not seem so great.

In 1951, the incumbent Israeli government resigned because of the aggressive way the left-wing secular camp (the workers' stream) used its political power to encourage people (sometimes in a very forceful manner) to enroll in their schools. The melting-pot ideology, which in fact was assimilation, prevailed. As a result of the public uproar in Israel and in the Diaspora, a national committee was established, chaired by a supreme court judge, Gad Frumkin. The committee concluded that the education system systematically interfered with religious studies, and forced the cutting of side-locks of religious boys. This was not carried out as an intentional war against the religious, but as a process of preferred adaptation as perceived by government representatives (Zameret, 1993). The elections were thus about politics, education, and religion. David Ben-Gurion, after being re-elected as prime minister, planned to merge all the streams into a single national current. This goal was the subject of fierce controversy. The arguments were similar to those already outlined. The religious politicians wanted to assure the existence of their own educational streams. Ben-Gurion was concerned about the influence of socialist ideology in the workers' stream, and he did not invite the (more extreme) socialist party (Mapam) to join the government (Zameret, 1997). Moshe Sharett (who later became the second prime minister of Israel) feared religious influence on secular education (Rinot, 1986). **As a result, in 1953, the State Education Law was passed. The law distinguished three different types of schools: state schools (fully funded, without autonomy), 'recognized' schools (partly funded with close to full autonomy), and 'exempted' schools. Today, 'exempted' education satisfies the requirements of the Education Law, and its schools are therefore exempt from the Compulsory Education Law and have no pedagogical restrictions imposed on them. Most of the 'exempted' schools are ultra-orthodox and anti-Zionist, and do not request or receive any state financial support.**

The 1953 law, regarding the Jewish schools, forced the two secular streams (the general and the workers' streams) to merge into a new state (secular) educational stream, and their supervisory committees were abolished. The Mizrahi stream, however, became the state religious educational stream.

Mizrahi's political control of state religious schools was secured by the party's supremacy on the Council for Religious Education (which replaced the Orthodox Supervisory Committee) that, since 1953, has been in charge of state religious education. This council operates independently of the Ministry of Education and Culture, reporting only to the government. The majority of council members are nominated by orthodox religious politicians. Apart from being solely responsible for making decisions regarding religious education, the council is also authorized by law 'on religious grounds only, to disqualify a person for appointment or further service as a principal, inspector or teacher at a religious state educational institution' (Goldstein, 1992, p. 44). Similar arrangements

for state secular education do not exist. As there is no secular council for state education, it is not protected from religious influence.

The 1953 law was an important step in the advancement of religious power. Total control of the curriculum was enforced only on the secular streams: the two were united, and the stream that emphasized secularism (the workers' stream) was abolished. The political affiliation of educational streams was discontinued with respect to the secular stream only. Thus, this law marked a continued educational shift: the secular segment abandoned its own secular stream, even without founding a secular educational council, and discontinued the affiliation with secular political parties and organizations. None of this happened to religious education.

While the secular group continued its educational surrender, the religious section continued its cultural advancement. The religious streams were separated: one became public, but kept its political affiliation; and one chose to become a nonpublic stream, as Agudat Israel feared for its independence. The Agudat Israel schools are classified as private schools. 'This situation is again a function of the recognition of the need for autonomy in religious education as well as that of the desire for the creation of exclusive and total religious educational environments as distinguished from merely adding to or subtracting from curricular subjects' (Goldstein, 1992, p. 60). The Agudat Israel politicians were afraid that the State Education Law 1953 would limit their absolute autonomy, so they opted out of state education. They received the status of 'recognized' schools, which in practice meant total freedom for their educational system but less state financial support. However, their political advantage, namely holding the balance of power between the left and the right in the government, resulted in a steady rise in the financial support they obtained from the state. It has become about equal to that received by state schools (Goldstein, 1992). The Israeli political arena is divided into several parties. The Jewish political parties are clustered around three groups: the right-wing, the left-wing, and the religious parties. The latter are traditionally part of any coalition; they sometimes hold the balance of power because of their electoral strength, but also because their inclusion is part of their broader social influence on Israeli society. One of the main cultural sources of Zionism is the Jewish religion (Kimerling, 1993).

In the 1990s, a new stream of religious education was founded by Shas, a fairly recently formed political party. It is in part ethnically and religiously based on Middle Eastern Jews and an ultra-orthodox theology and discourse. It accuses the secular Ashkenazis (Jews of European and American origin) of discriminating against the Eastern Jews and keeping them in the lowest segment of Israeli society (Fisher, 1998). Shas began as a local party in Jerusalem in 1983, but ran in the 1984 general elections for the Knesset (Israeli parliament). Since then Shas has grown, and is currently the third largest party in the Knesset and the largest religious party in Israel. In 1985, it founded *El Hamaayan* ("To the Fountain"), a network of institutions engaged in nonformal education for children, youth, and adults. *El Hamayan* branches exist in almost every Jewish town in Israel and offer a large variety of extra-curricula religious activities: Bible lessons for adults, lectures for women, and courses for children and adults. According to its director, in 1997, the movement supplied more than 600,000 h of orthodox religious activities. In 1991, a Shas network of formal education officially received the status of a 'recognized' educational stream: the Fountain of Religious Education. In only a few years, the network has increased its activities to 80 daycare centers, 650 kindergartens, and 140 elementary schools. Its institutions are attended by 38,000 children, taught by 3000 school teachers and kindergarten and nursery school teachers, who are paid the same salaries as teachers in the state schools (Dayan, 1998).

Strangely, in return for granting more money, the state relinquishes its supervisory power. State religious education receives more than the secular state education. Seventh-grade state-religious students receive one weekly hour more than secular students, eighth-graders receive 2 h more, and ninth-graders 3 h more than secular students (3–9% difference). In addition, state religious schools have specific financial aid that is unique to them and includes budgetary items such as ‘sex separation’ (splitting the age group to female- and male-only classes, thus increasing the number of classes), special hours for rabbis, and additional extra-curricular religious studies (Sahar, 1999). However, the gap increases with regard to the degree of religiosity. The extra financial support is received in different ways. In 1997, students in independent education received 15% (22% in 1996) more hours than students in state education (religious and secular), and each hour of independent education cost 7% more than each hour of state education. In 1996, students in Shas education received 31% more hours, and in 1997 47% more hours, than students in state education (religious and secular), and in the latter year each hour of Shas education cost 13% more than state education (Schiffer, 1998). In a different study (Swirski *et al.*, 1998, p. 12), findings on the basic hours allocated per student are shown to be similar: students at the independent schools receive 14% more hours than those at state schools, and those at Shas schools receive 57% more (interestingly, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport obstructs any attempt to obtain this information: Swirski *et al.*, 1998, p. 13). This account applies to the elementary school system, but matters are no different in high school. Shas education, being a new network, does not yet have high schools. However, 25,000 students of the ‘private’ independent stream study at junior high (Grades 7–9), and high schools receive 40–50% more financial support than state education students (Schiffer, 1998).

The less a school is financially supported by the state, the more it is supervised. State schools do not have the power of the independent stream. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport does not intervene in the various religious schools’ curricula, ‘as any attempt to intervene in the ultra-orthodox religious education will bring about intervention on the political level’ (Ilan, 1998). Thus, the next step in the cultural shift has occurred: the minimal curricular requirements are not practiced, while the level of financial support has risen above that of the state schools. The religious sector continues its cultural advancement; it has thereby created a situation that has become a model for another religious educational stream.

The establishment of Agudat Israel and Shas nonpublic education, which is funded as public education but has no limitations, was another move against the secular unifying forces. The secular groups gave up the financial power that they might have used as pedagogical and curricular strings for political considerations. The education system was the arena in which the religious and secular groups struggled. **The growth of Shas education manifests the cultural (advancement) shift of the religions sector: from marginalized ultra-orthodox education at the end of World War II to total independent fully financed education.**

The ‘Hegemonic’ Religious Curriculum

Another important dimension in which to probe the level of hegemony and dominance of religious education is the actual religious curriculum in secular schools. **Religion is present in their curricula in official and unofficial ways. The official way is twofold; namely, through Bible studies and Jewish studies that appear in many forms, including literature, the arts, history, and textbooks on the humanities. Unofficially, religion is**

presented through the introduction of extra-curricular activities into the curriculum by a variety of means.

Bible studies are compulsory from Grade 2 until the end of high school, and are also a compulsory subject in the matriculation examinations required for higher education. The central question is how are Bible studies taught—in a religious way or in a secular way? Even if the teacher presents the material from a secular angle, which it is not always the case as secular teachers try to avoid teaching ethics (Zur, 1994), the texts have one theme: the cause of all events is God's will. A national committee (the Shenhar committee) examining the issue of religion and education recommended 'deliberate efforts to recruit teachers living the life style and possessing the views that are customary across the entire range of secular society' (Shenhar, 1994, p. 24). This recommendation, like the others in the report, is not generally practiced (see Resh & Benavot, 1998).

Four hours a week are devoted to Bible studies in Grades 2–9 and 3 h in Grades 10–12 (including Oral Law, namely Talmud). In Grades 2–9, only mathematics and Hebrew receive the same number of weekly hours. No other subject is given as much time (Goldstein, 1992, p. 51). The state religious educational system teaches even more Bible and other religious subjects than the state secular system. Moreover, 'in the State religious system all courses are taught with emphasis on their religious aspects' (Goldstein, 1992, p. 53), including the concept that the world was created by God, and not according to Darwinian ideas of evolution (Goldstein, 1992).

While the religious instruction in secular schools is apparent, civil studies and democracy studies do not exist in the ultra-orthodox education (Dayan, 1998). This situation illustrates the predominance of the religious culture and the inferiority of the secular culture. The full financing of nonsecular education manifests the 'nonhegemonic' secular education/curriculum/culture, while reflecting the hegemonic religious education/curriculum/culture.

The Hegemony of Religious Practices in Secular Schools

While state religious education has absolute autonomy, state secular education does not. Secular schools are not protected against the introduction of religious rituals, but the infiltration of religious matters into them is much more extensive than is evident from the public debate and the relevant research, and it is not documented. The following cases, which were assembled and probed specially for this study, may highlight the gravity of this situation.

In 1996, a seventh-grade class at a state secular school celebrated a class *barmitzva* (a ceremony whereby a Jewish boy aged 13 assumes adult religious obligations). The school decided to celebrate the occasion by inviting an orthodox rabbi to conduct the orthodox religious ritual during school hours. Only the boys took an active part, while the girls threw them candies (somewhat like cheerleaders at a football game). One boy objected to the religious ceremony and his parents tried unsuccessfully to have it stopped. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport was forced, unwillingly, to discuss their complaint, which after 1 year of stonewalling went before a committee set up by the head of the Pedagogical Secretariat (who reports to the director-general of the Ministry of Education; both he and the Minister of Education were orthodox observant Jews). The committee's conclusions were vague. They were not divulged by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport nor were the child's parents informed of them. Only after a legal warning were they submitted to the parents, but they were never published. The committee's conclusions supported both sides. On the one hand, they agreed with the

parents' view: 'A distinction must be made between teaching and actual fulfillment of the religious commandments. Religious rituals conducted in public, such as worship, donning phylacteries, Bible reading, etc., are a matter for the individual and his/her family; the school should treat them as subjects for study ... Because of the 'general' and public nature of this current and the heterogeneity of its population, the pupil should not be forced into conflicting situations between his/her home and his/her school' (Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport, 1997, pp. 2–3). On the other hand, the committee allowed the ceremony to take place, as the barmitzva ritual 'has religious, social and psychological components ... This ritual will be part of the overall educational process' (Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport, 1997, p. 4). This final statement contradicted the previous conclusions, and the Pedagogical Secretariat referred to it alone. It allowed the rituals to continue, 'while giving expression to the pluralism upheld by the state-secular educational stream' (Schild, 1997). The only time this decision was publicly reported was in reaction to criticism regarding a (secular state) high school in Ashdod (a town in southern Israel) whose students took part in a orthodox religious ritual to exorcise evil spirits (to remove curses). Some parents and teachers supported the ceremony, some did not.

'We sent our children to a state secular school so that they would receive knowledge and education', said angry parents yesterday, who were afraid to be identified, fearing that their children would suffer.

'We are against all these rituals ... This is religious coercion, and it has no place in the school or in the educational system' (Regev & Asulin, 1998, p. 23).

The reaction of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport (1997) was that religious rituals were allowed in the school, based on the '*Conclusions of the report on religious rituals at state schools*'. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel thereupon wrote to the Minister of Education on behalf of a group of parents demanding that the next planned religious ritual to remove curses for the remaining students be cancelled. In her letter, the attorney G. Shtoppler (1998) based her position on those conclusions in the 1997 Report that opposed the performance of such rituals in schools. The head of the southern region of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport cancelled the exorcism rituals, describing them as 'unacceptable for the educational system' (Tomer, 1998). Moreover, 'the school principal was reprimanded, and promised not to repeat such activities in the future' (Tomer, 1998).

These events leading up to the cancellation were the actions of a few people who contested religious rituals. In many cases, however, the matter goes unnoticed. **The religious level of practice is vague. The following two examples may illustrate this point. A tenth-grade student at a secular school in Kiryat Ono (a town in central Israel) was suspended from school because he refused to don a head cover and enter a synagogue (during a school trip). The teacher told the student that he could be forced to participate in any religious ritual (Sinaan, 1997). In a different incident, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport cancelled an educational workshop for state secular teachers because of the planned appearance of a gay representative (Reinfeld, 1998).**

The following different episodes show how religious statements can hurt secular students. **In September 1997, students at a state secular secondary school in Herzliya (a town in central Israel) were taken by the school to an orthodox synagogue. The rabbi spoke, and implied that Israeli soldiers had died because they had not observed the religious law. One student (interviewed for this study) left the synagogue greatly upset.** Another example is from an elementary school in a small town in northern Israel where

the students studied under a special program called Reinforcement of Jewish studies (*Tali*, in Hebrew; it is intended for state secular schools: Zisenwein & Goldring, 1992). The project is subsidized by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport, and teachers can develop their own programs. A state schoolteacher told fifth-grade students that a house without a *mezuzah* (parchment scroll with biblical text inside a case) on the doorpost is not a Jewish house. One of the students asked if a certain student (who was present) who did not have a *mezuzah* at home was a Jew. The teacher was shocked and confused, and unable to answer. Students without the *mezuzah* at their home could be ostracized by their classmates because their parents held different views of Judaism.

The state schools do not have clear policies on religious studies and instruction and ritual, so the personal price paid by atheist children can be high, even if they are exempted from religious practices[2] The cost to the secular students attending prayers can be explained through the term 'cultural capital'. The cost is due to the disregarded culture that the secular student brings with him/her. **The school cultural capital is 'traditional' and not secular, even though it is a state school that is supposed to cater to various cultures, beliefs, and norms. The school expects the student to adapt himself/herself to the school, and does not critically evaluate itself.**

Religious Dominance Within Religious Autonomy

The state secular schools alone are without autonomy or any mechanism to protect their autonomy. The state religious schools have the very powerful Orthodox Supervisory Committee. Total autonomy exists in the independent stream and in the exempted schools. Their junior-high and high-school curricula have only religious studies; secular studies are excluded. Their graduates do not have the option of going on to university. **In an interview (in August 1998), a student who had studied at exempted schools revealed some disturbing information.**

- **The image of secular Israelis is extremely negative. Secular people are seen as 'empty vessels', without culture or values, and as only being interested in satisfying their basic vulgar needs;** many of them are drug addicts and criminals who hate religion and religious people (similar and even more extreme ideas were exposed by Channel One of Israel Television on 23 August 1998; Shas distributed a video cassette depicting the state (secular and religious) students as 75% drug addicts, many with criminal records, etc.). Moreover, these views possibly reflect the cultural capital of the religious students. To create the religious group identity, religious socialization agents often promote racist views of secular people. They are regarded as 'captured babies' who do not offer any real alternative to Jewish life, and their way constitutes but a temporary, inferior stage (E1-Or, 1990)
- **The independent and exempted junior high schools, known as 'small yeshivot' (rabbinical colleges), and more especially the high schools, or 'large yeshivot', discriminate against Jews of Sephardi (eastern) origin.** They have quotas for the number of Sephardi Jews allowed to study in them, and the more prestigious the yeshiva is, the smaller the quotas. Usually, the unofficial quotas are 5–10%, but then they can rise to 25%, depending on the specific yeshiva's policy.

Religious educational autonomy is also a costly issue for Israeli society. Students who receive autonomous religious education often graduate without qualifications enabling them to obtain a regular 'nonreligious' job or to continue their studies at college or university. Nonstate schools have a relatively high dropout rate and a low success rate

in matriculation examinations (Chen, 1992). Moreover, it is questionable whether the products of such schools will be able to play a part in the current struggle for peace (Adler, 1994). Even themes of democracy are not taught in many independent and exempted schools, so secular concepts that allow the existence of any modern state are not necessarily shared by their graduates (Dayan, 1998).

An important aspect that is usually overlooked in the religious–secular debate is the status of women. The state fully finances the religious education system that reduces one-half its students to an inferior level. Throughout Jewish history, the rabbinical religious authorities limited the amount of religious studies permitted to women. They justified this on two grounds: women do not have the necessary ‘cognitive adjustment’ for it; and intensive learning activities can morally harm the innocence of women (Elinson, 1996, p. 143). The difference in the level of religious studies reflects the subordinate status of women in religious (mainly ultra-orthodox) society. The level of literacy that these women are allowed to reach is determined by the (male) rabbis. There is a ‘restricted literacy’ (Goody, 1988), so the liberating power of literacy is restricted by social forces. Girls are not allowed to engage in sophisticated religious studies, and the purpose of the education (mainly among the ultra-orthodox) system is to keep them subordinate to the dominant male students (El-Or, 1990). The cultural production of the ultra-orthodox is male-dominant, and builds the ‘relevant’ ‘capital culture’ of the men and women, differentially corresponding to their expected role as adults.

This situation unmistakably manifests the cultural shift: the anti-secular, anti-democratic curriculum, the intolerance, the racist and male-dominance concepts that are preached, and the attainment of ‘nonproductive’ qualifications are the most powerful examples of religious cultural advancement and secular cultural surrender. Not only does the state not use its power to enforce secular culture, but it actually supports religious culture that is anti-secular. The move (from secular dominance to religious dominance) that started at the beginning of the century has become complete at its end.

Discussion

State education is funded by all taxpayers and should reflect the meaning of the word ‘state’ and the needs of its citizens. Usually, the more the state finances the schools, the less independence they have, and vice versa (for example, Shapiro, 1985). However, in Israel, the situation of state education reflects the political power of minority Jewish groups, and the rights of the majority are not protected.

The shift from religious cultural subordination to dominance reflects the correspondence principle: it mirrors the political, social, and financial situation of the religious as a group. This situation is also explained by politics, and the political explanation applying the ‘Coalition Theory’ offered by Schachter (1972) and by Bar-Lev (1991) can best describe it. This theory states that to attain political stability, majority parties prefer a form of coalition with political parties whose spheres of interest differ. The right-wing’s chief concerns are hawkish policies regarding the Israeli–Arab conflict, while the left-wing’s chief concerns are dovish policies. The traditional stands of right and left regarding social and economic policies, and the amount of government intervention used to be far apart, but during the 1980s and 1990s the gap between them narrowed. The religious parties’ chief concerns are religious, and keeping their religious education is one of the most important of them. They differ among themselves in their stand towards the Arab–Israel conflict; however, they were more dovish prior to the 1967 war and became more hawkish after it, a shift that coincided with the 1977 change of government from

left to right. Since the founding of Israel, the National Religious Party of the religious Zionists belonged to almost every governing coalition, and for most of the past two decades the Ministry of Education and Culture was controlled by that party. This signifies religious domination in Israel in general, and in the Jewish education system in particular. In her study, Keller (1992) reveals that until 1977 the two public state education systems were autonomous, but the discourse has changed since the National Religious Party took over this Ministry. The religious state schools came to serve as models for the secular state schools, and religious texts published by the Ministry of Education and Culture 'point to the absorption of the Jewish religious text into the ideological state system' (1992, p. 129).

The secular Zionist ideology has come to adopt many religious aspects; the national symbols continue to be influenced by religion (Kimerling, 1993) and Zionist ideology is influenced by religious ideas. Israeli national identity is based on religious foundations (Weissbrod, 1983). Some of the basic laws underpinning the state of Israel are partly grounded in religious law. The Israeli social atmosphere is heavily influenced by religious laws and traditions. There is no separation between state and religion, and religious law is applied in some areas of life (England, 1987; Goldstein, 1992). Thus, the religious hegemony in education reflects a religious hegemony in the civil society.

According to Peleg (1997), Israel is in the midst of a cultural war, and the religious element in Israel is much more organized than the secular because of basic cultural differences between the two groups. The religious culture is active, and strictly differentiates itself from the secular culture (or nonculture): it demands loyalty to the group, its leaders, and its symbols. It reacts to modernization not by accepting pluralist ideas and/or adapting to modern times, but by acting aggressively towards any pluralistic ideas, and it mobilizes its supporters forcefully to attack any compromise. Moreover, the religious element supplies 'the blueprint' for the development of an informal political organization: images, symbols, leaders, and a sense of belonging. The only real laws are religious laws; civil laws are temporary and may be ignored. Religion provides its followers with security, that of a wholly organized setting in an unstable world. Religion cares for its adherents' thoughts, relationships, and beliefs. As secularism is based on individualism, secular people do not have such a safe haven. Asking unresolved questions is part of shaping the secular life, and not something to shy away from. In fact, there is no secular 'camp' (Peleg, 1997). In the cultural war, there is therefore practically only one side. The secular camp of the beginning of the century has dwindled to secular individuals who react sporadically. They no longer have their former cultural legitimization. Moreover, the religious groups have managed not only to mobilize their people, but to transform their views from marginal to mainstream, from subordinate to dominant. While the secular culture has shifted from hegemonic to nonhegemonic, the religious culture has done the opposite.

The nonexistence of a secular 'camp' is an important factor explaining why the secular part of the population has failed to redress its powerlessness. In contrast to the organization of different religious groups that focus on the educational system, secular Israelis concentrate on other issues (such as endless debates about defense policies). The Arab-Israel conflict that has existed since the beginning of Zionism elicits not only debate and controversy, but also survival tactics. Under the slogan of unity, the secular groups were ready to yield on internal ideological matters as long as there was national unity against the outside. For their part, the religious parties were willing to cooperate with any secular party as long as their ideological, educational, and financial demands were accepted. That situation also reflects the religious belief that the secular people do

not have ideological values and norms to guide them. In Riesman's (1950) terms, the religious perceive themselves as having an 'inner-directed' social character, shaped by a religious ethic, while the secular have an 'other-directed' type of social character, shaped by cultural and technological trends.

These circumstances led to a situation where a potential conflict does not exist as there is only one active side. The secular side keeps clear of the arena, which is left free for the religious side exclusively. Although secular people occasionally react to (but do not initiate) extreme situations, they are a silent majority.

Religious practices in secular schools and religious education funded by the state is a controversial issue debated in many democratic countries. The fact that this topic is a nonissue, and a 'nonconflict' in Israel, for the reasons already elaborated, may be very favorable for some religious groups, but it is extremely disadvantageous for the state, its democratic foundations, and many of its citizens.

The correspondence principle can explain the relation between state practices and their manifestation in the education system. However, the situation is circular: the education system socializes and reproduces the next generation, which will reinforce these notions. The current religious dominance not only reflects the national culture, but it also intensifies this process.

This paper has described the historical and political events that led to the situation in which the secular majority lost its dominance to the religious minority. Cultural legitimacy changed sides during the twentieth century, as hegemony over culture and over curriculum moved from secularism to religiosity. In Giroux's (1981) terms, the religious groups established their views of the world as all-inclusive and universal for the entire Jewish population. The cultural capital of the education system implies that there is a hierarchical ordering of cultures, where religious culture, which was the at the bottom of the ladder, changed places with secular culture, which was higher up. However, further research is necessary to explore the importance for Jewish identity of religious beliefs, which have been instrumental in the secular surrender to the religious groups. Consequently, it is not surprising that the more the state finances schools, the less it demands of them, with deleterious effects. Yet this unique situation continues relatively unnoticed.

Correspondence: Shmuel Shamai, Golan Research Institute, University of Haifa, 3 Shiezf Street, Kazrin 12900, Israel.

NOTES

[1] Ber Borochof, for example, advocated the concept of an organic unity between socialism and Zionism, by synthesizing the class struggle and nationalism. The right answer for the Jewish people was to prepare the Land of Israel, through a pioneering effort, as a new territory for Jewish immigrants. This would end the exploitation of Jews in the Diaspora, by the formation instead of a Jewish national economic body as a framework for the natural class struggle of the Jewish proletariat (Borochof, 1955)

Borochof's views were disputed by the Bund, a Jewish socialist political movement founded in 1897 active in mainly in Russia and Poland. The Bund regarded the Zionist movement as a reactionary bourgeois movement that distracted the Jews from the class struggle in the places where they lived. The Jews should be involved in the local socialist parties and organizations (Tobias, 1972; Eisenstadt, 1974).

A more extreme view was suggested by Karl Kautsky; namely, that the Jews had ceased to be a nation as they had no territory. The Jews' problem would be solved by assimilation. There was no point in

establishing the Zionist state as the Land of Israel lacked the necessary economic conditions. The success of the workers' revolution would bring about their salvation (Kautsky, 1926). Kautsky's ideas were adopted by the Russian communist leaders, but only by a minority of the Jews. The Bund faded away between the first and the second world war. Hence, only the Zionists influenced Jewish education in Israel.

- [2] The issue of human rights was not at the center of public debate and was never legally contested in Israel, but it was already being addressed elsewhere. The debate about freedom of religion and freedom from religion is ubiquitous in democracies around the world. Liberal views are against enforcing religious beliefs and religious studies and instruction. According to Hart (1963), following John Stuart Mill's (1877) famous idea, 'The only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others' (Hart, 1963, p. 4). The conservative position may be represented by Devlin (1965), who opposes the view of Hart and Mill. He asserts that the state has the right to legislate its moral rules and enforce them on society, as they are required for its preservation. James Fitzjames Stephen (1874), a conservative utilitarian, also argued against Mill. Both Mill and Stephen judged Liberty in terms of Utility. Mill (1877) asserted that Utility meant personal liberty, while Stephen (1874) saw it as damaging: Utility could not be achieved by unlimited personal freedom. Mill argued that if schools taught religion, it should be done in an impartial way, which was not always the case in England (Hull, 1982).

The broader theoretical debate was the focus of the more specific debate regarding introduction of religion practices (mainly prayers) in public schools in North America, among other places. In 1962, the US Supreme Court forbade organized school prayer and, currently, in 1999, it is debating the issue of school prayers in sport activities (Horowitz, 1999). A similarly liberal view was adopted, for instance, by the Ontario Supreme Court. The court pointed out that exemption of students from religious exercises or instruction could not be regarded as an appropriate way to defend these practices, as minority students were being differentiated from the rest of the student body, and therefore were under pressure to give up their rights (Corporation of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association *et al.* vs. Minister of Education *et al.*, 1988; Shamai, 1997).

REFERENCES

- ADLER, C. (1994) Education and nation building. The case of Israel. Paper presented at the *XIII World Congress of Sociology*, Bielefeld, July.
- BAR-LEV, M. (1991) Politicization and depoliticization of Jewish religious education in Israel, *Religious Education*, 86, pp. 608–618.
- BAT-YEHUDA, G. (1986) The question of the culture issue and Mizrahi, in: M. BAR LEV (Ed.) *Religious Education in Israeli Society*, pp. 3–22 (Jerusalem, The Hebrew University) (in Hebrew).
- BENTWICH, Y. (1960) *Education in the State of Israel* (Tel Aviv, Yehoshua Cizik Publications) (in Hebrew).
- BERNSTEIN, B. (1971–1977) *Class, Codes and Control*, Volumes 1–3 (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul).
- BOURDIEU, P. & PASSERON, J. (1977) *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (London, Sage).
- BOROCHOV, B. (1955) *Works* (Tel Aviv, Hakibuz Hameuchad) (in Hebrew).
- BOWLES, S. & GINTIS, H. (1976) *Schooling in Capitalist America* (New York, Basic Books).
- CHEN, M. (1992) School choice in a national system segregated by religion and ideology: the case of Israel. Paper presented at the *American Sociological Association Conference*, Pittsburgh, PA, 20–24 August.
- CORPORATION OF THE CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION *ET AL.* VS. MINISTER OF EDUCATION *ET AL.*, (1988) *Ontario Reports*, 2nd edition, 64, pp. 577–719.
- CORRIGAN P. (1987) Race/ethnicity/gender/culture: embodying differences educationally: an argument, in: J. YOUNG (Ed.) *Breaking the Mosaic*, pp. 20–30 (Toronto, Garamond Press).
- DAYAN, A. (1998) 'What did you study today in Shas?' The educational system of Shas, *Hed Hachinuch*, 72, pp. 4–13 (in Hebrew).
- DEVLIN, P. (1965) *The Enforcement of Morals* (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
- EISENSTADT, S. (1974) *Chapters of History of Jewish Labour Movement* (Tel Aviv, Likud) (in Hebrew).
- ELBOIM-DROR, R. (1990) *Hebrew education in the Land of Israel*, Volume 2, 1914–1920 (Jerusalem, Yad Ben Zevi Publications) (in Hebrew).
- ELINSON, E. (1996) *Between Women to Their Creator* (Jerusalem, Eliner Library) (in Hebrew).
- EL-OR, T. (1990) *Educated and Ignorant: on ultra-orthodox women and their world* (Tel Aviv, Am Oved) (in Hebrew).
- ENGLAND, I. (1987) Law and religion in Israel, *American Journal of Comparative Law*, 35, pp. 185–208.
- FISHER, S. (1998) 'Why Shas?'. Paper presented at the *Conference of the Israel Sociological Society*, University of Haifa, Israel, 24 February 24 (in Hebrew).
- GIROUX, H. (1981) Hegemony, resistance, and the paradox of educational reform, *Interchange*, 12, pp. 3–26.

- GIROUX, H. (1983) Theories of reproduction and resistance in the new sociology of education: a critical analysis, *Harvard Educational Review*, 53, pp. 257–293.
- GOLDSTEIN, S. (1992) The teaching of religion in government funded schools in Israel, *Israel Law Review*, 26, pp. 36–64.
- GOODY, J. (1988) *The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
- HART, H.L. (1963) *Law, Liberty and Morality* (Stanford, MA, Stanford University Press).
- HOROWITZ, N. (1999) To separate religious from the classroom, *Haaretz*, 30 November, p. A10 (in Hebrew).
- HULL, J. (Ed.) (1982) Introduction: new directions in religious education, in: *New Directions in Religious Education*, pp. 11–16 (Basingstoke, Palmer Press).
- ILAN, S. (1998) About benefactors and religious schools, *Haaretz*, 4 August, p. B2 (in Hebrew).
- KAHANA, K. (1969) Agudat Israel, in: M. PELEI & B. PELEI (Eds) *Encyclopaedia Hebraica*, Volume 1, pp. 371–374 (in Hebrew).
- KAUTSKY, K. (1926) *Are the Jews a Race?*, Translated from the 2nd German edition (London, Jonathan Cape Ltd).
- KELLER, D. (1992) State education and state religious education: two ideological frameworks. *Ph.D. thesis* (Jerusalem, Hebrew University) (in Hebrew).
- KIEL, Y. (1973) The State religious education, in: H. ORMIAM (Ed.) *Education In Israel*, pp. 106–110 (Jerusalem, Ministry of Education and Culture) (in Hebrew).
- KIMERLING, B. (1993) State–society relations in Israel, in: U. RAM (Ed.) *Israeli Society: critical perspectives*, pp. 106–110 (Tel Aviv, Brerot) (in Hebrew).
- MALLEA, J. (1989) *Schooling in Plural Canada* (Clevedon, UK, Multilingual Matters).
- MILL, J.S. (1877) *On Liberty* (New York, Henry Holt).
- MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORT (1997) Conclusions of the report on religious rituals at state schools. Unpublished report (Jerusalem, Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport) (in Hebrew).
- PELEG, M. (1997) The cultural analysis of politics: the case of religion in Israel. Paper presented at the *Conference of Israel Sociological Society*, The Academic College of Tel Aviv-Yaffo, Israel, 9 February (in Hebrew).
- REGEV, D. & ASULIN, Y. (1998) A lesson in curses and amulets, *Yediot Aharonot*, 6 January, p. 23 (in Hebrew).
- REINFELD, M. (1998) The Ministry of Education cancelled workshop because of fear that a homosexual would appear there, *Haaretz*, 17 August, p. 9A (in Hebrew).
- RESH, N. & BENAVID, A. (1998) *An Evaluation of the Implementation of the Shenhar Committee Report: Jewish education in the state sector junior-high schools* (Jerusalem, Hebrew University) (in Hebrew).
- RESHEF, S. & DROR, Y. (1999) *Hebrew Education in the Years of National Homeland (1919–1948)* (Tel Aviv, Bialik Institute) (in Hebrew).
- RIESMAN, D. (1950) *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press).
- RINOT, M. (1986) The debate on shaping the Hebrew education system in the Land of Israel (1918–1920), in: M. BAR LEV (Ed.) *Religious Education in Israeli Society*, pp. 106–110 (Jerusalem, The Hebrew University) (in Hebrew).
- SAHAR, R. (1999) Ministry of education reduced 55% of the hours allocated to the state-religious education, *Haaretz*, 30 November, pp. A1, A12 (in Hebrew).
- SCHACHTER, H.L. (1972) Educational institutions and political coalitions: the case of Israel, *Comparative Educational Review*, 16, pp. 462–473.
- SCHIFFER, V. (1998) *The Ultra-Orthodox Education System in Israel: allocation, supervision, and control* (Jerusalem, The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies) (in Hebrew).
- SCHILD, O. (1997) Religious rituals in state (secular) schools. Unpublished letter from the Head of the Pedagogical Secretariat to the Shamai family, 5 June (in Hebrew).
- SCHWEID, E. (1981) *Judaism and Secular Culture* (Tel Aviv, Hakibbutz Hameuchad) (in Hebrew).
- SHAMAI, S. (1990) Critical sociology of education theory in practice: the Druze education in the Golan, *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 11, pp. 449–463.
- SHAMAI, S. (1997) Jewish resistance to Christianity in the Ontario public education system, *Canadian History of Education Journal*, 9, pp. 251–255.
- SHAPIRO, B.J. (1985) *The Report of the Commission on Private Schools in Ontario* (Toronto, Government of Ontario).
- SHENHAR, A. (1994) A nation and the world: Jewish culture in a changing world, *Recommendations of the Committee for Studying Jewish Studies in State Education* (Jerusalem, Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture) (in Hebrew).
- SHILHAV, Y.M. (1981) The struggle for the independence of the Jewish educational system in Eretz-Israel during the British mandate. Doctoral thesis (Ramat Gan, Israel, Department of Jewish History, Bar Ilan University) (in Hebrew).
- SHTOPPLER, G. (1998) The ritual of curse exorcism at a comprehensive high school in Ashdod. Unpublished letter from the Association for Civil Rights in Israel to the Minister of Education, 8 January (in Hebrew).

- SINAAN, T. (1997) Report on Army Radio, morning summary of news in the media, 26 March (in Hebrew).
- STEPHEN, F.J. (1874) *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity* (London, Smith, Elder).
- SWIRSKI, S., KONOR, E. & YECHEKEL, Y. (1998) *Government Budgets for the Jewish Orthodox Sector* (Tel Aviv, Adva Center) (in Hebrew).
- TOBIAS, H. (1972) *The Jewish Bund in Russia* (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press).
- TOMER, I. (1998) The ritual of curse exorcism at a comprehensive high school in Ashdod: your letter dated 8 January 1998. Unpublished letter from the Director of the southern region, Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport, 19 January (in Hebrew).
- WADE, S., BROWN, P., SKEGGS, B. & AGGLETON, P. (1989) Louts and legends, *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 10, pp. 481–493.
- WEISSEROD, L. (1983) Religion as national identity in a secular society, *Review of Religious Research*, 24, pp. 188–205.
- WILLIS, P. (1983) Cultural production and theories of reproduction, in: L. BARTON & S. WALKER (Eds) *Race, Class and Education*, pp. 106–110 (London, Croom Helm).
- ZAMERET, Z. (1993) *The Melting Pot—The Frumkin Commission On the Education of Immigrant Children—1950* (Beer Sheva, Israel, The Ben-Gurion Heritage Center) (in Hebrew).
- ZAMERET, Z. (1997) *Across a Narrow Bridge—Shaping the Educational System During the Aliya* (Beer Sheva, Israel, Ben-Gurion Heritage Center) (in Hebrew).
- ZISENWEIN, D. & GOLDRING, E. (1992) *Tali*: Alternative Israeli religious education, in: M. BAR-LEV (Ed.) *Religious Education and Religious Youth: dilemmas and tensions*, pp. 106–110 (Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv University School of Education) (in Hebrew).
- ZUR, M. (1994) To stop the religious monopoly on Jewish education, *Aley Chinuch*, 5, pp. 106–110 (in Hebrew).