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MICHAEL W. DOYLE

## Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2\*

### VI

Even though liberalism has achieved striking success in creating a zone of peace and, with leadership, a zone of cooperation among states similarly liberal in character, liberalism has been equally striking as a failure in guiding foreign policy outside the liberal world. In these foreign relations, liberalism leads to three confusing failings: the first two are what Hume called “imprudent vehemence” and, conversely, a “careless and supine complaisance”;<sup>39</sup> the third is the political uncertainty that is intro-

\* This is the second half of a two-part article. In addition to those mentioned in the first half, I would also like to thank the Ford Foundation, whose grant supported some of the research on which this article draws, the Institute for Advanced Study, Exxon, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. The themes of Parts 1 and 2 of this essay were first developed in a paper written in June 1981. That paper drew on a short presentation delivered at the Conference on the Future of American Liberalism, Princeton, New Jersey, 3–4 April 1981.

39. David Hume, “Of the Balance of Power” in *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary* (1741–1742) (Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 346–47. With “imprudent vehemence,” Hume referred to the English reluctance to negotiate an early peace with France and the total scale of the effort devoted to prosecuting that war, which together were responsible for over half the length of the fighting and an enormous war debt. With “complaisance,” he referred to political exhaustion and isolationism. Hume, of course, was not describing fully liberal republics as defined here; but the characteristics he describes, do seem to reflect some of the liberal republican features of the English eighteenth century constitution (the influence of both popular opinion and a representative [even if severely limited] legislature). He contrasts these effects to the “prudent politics” that should govern the balance of power and to the special but different failings characteristic of “enormous monarchies,” which are prone to strategic overextension, bureaucratic, and ministerial decay in court intrigue, praetorian rebellion (pp. 347–48). These failings are different from those of more, even if not fully, republican regimes. Indeed just as the eighteenth century English failings illuminate aspects of contemporary liberal diplomacy, the failings of his universal monarchy seem to be reflected in some aspects of the contemporary authoritarian and totalitarian predicament.

duced by the moral ambiguity of the liberal principles which govern the international distribution of property.

Imprudent vehemence is the most familiar failing. In relations with powerful states of a nonliberal character, liberal policy has been characterized by repeated failures of diplomacy. It has often raised conflicts of interest into crusades; it has delayed in taking full advantage of rivalries within nonliberal alliances; it has failed to negotiate stable mutual accommodations of interest. In relations with weak states of a nonliberal character, liberal policy has succumbed to imperial interventions that it has been unable to sustain or to profit from. Its interventions, designed to create liberal societies by promoting the economic development and political stability of nonliberal societies, have frequently failed to achieve their objects. Confusion, drift, costly crusades, spasmodic imperialism are the contrasting record of liberal foreign policy *outside* the liberal world. A failure to negotiate with the powerful and a failure to create stable clients among the weak are its legacies.<sup>40</sup> Why?

These failures mainly flow from two sources. First, outside the pacific union, liberal regimes, like all other states, are caught in the international state of war Hobbes and the Realists describe. Conflict and wars are a natural outcome of struggles for resources, prestige, and security among independent states; confusion is an unsurprising accompaniment in a state of war without reliable law or organization.

Second, these failures are also the natural complement of liberalism's success as an intellectual guide to foreign policy among liberal states. *The very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interests, and international respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal*

40. A careful statistical analysis that has just appeared, R. J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, no. 1 (March 1983), empirically demonstrates that "libertarian" states engaged neither in war nor in other forms of conflict with each other in the period 1946–1980. (But his definition of libertarian appears to be more restrictive than my definition of liberal states.) He also finds that between 1946 and 1980 libertarian states were less likely to engage in any form of conflict than were states of any other domestic political regime. The extensive history of liberal imperialism and the liberal role in conflicts and wars between liberal and nonliberal states for the longer period from the 1790s that I survey lead me to conclusions which differ from his second point. Both George Kennan's *American Diplomacy* (New York: Mentor, 1951) and Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973), esp. p. 147, are cogent criticisms of the impact of American liberalism. Different but related analyses of the impact of liberal principles and institutions on U.S. foreign policy are made by Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), esp. pp. 114–43.

*societies can exacerbate conflicts in relations between liberal and non-liberal societies.*

If the legitimacy of state action rests on the fact that it respects and effectively represents morally autonomous individuals, then states that coerce their citizens or foreign residents lack moral legitimacy. Even Kant regarded the attitude of “primitive peoples” attached to a lawless liberty as “raw, uncivilized, and an animalic degradation of humanity.”<sup>41</sup> When states reject the cosmopolitan law of access (a rejection that authoritarian or communist states, whether weak or powerful, can often find advantageous and, indeed, necessary for their security), Kant declares that they violate natural law:

The inhospitable ways of coastal regions, such as the Barbary Coast, where they rob ships in the adjoining seas or make stranded seamen into slaves, is contrary to natural law, as are the similarly inhospitable ways of the deserts and their Bedouins, who look upon the approach of a foreigner as giving them a right to plunder him.<sup>42</sup>

Nevertheless, Kant rejects conquest or imperial intervention as an equal wrong. The practice of liberal states, which in many cases only applies liberal principles in part, has not been so forbearing.

According to liberal practice, some nonliberal states, such as the United States’ communist rivals, do not acquire the right to be free from foreign intervention, nor are they assumed to respect the political independence and territorial integrity of other states. Instead conflicts of interest become interpreted as steps in a campaign of aggression against the liberal state. Of course, powerful authoritarian or totalitarian states, such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, sometimes wage direct or indirect campaigns of aggression against liberal regimes. And totalitarian diplomacy is clouded by the pervasive secrecy these societies establish. But part of the atmosphere of suspicion can be attributed to the perception by liberal states that nonliberal states are in a permanent state of aggression against their own people. Referring to fascist states, Cordell Hull concluded, “their very nature requires them to be aggressive.”<sup>43</sup> Efforts by nonliberal states at accommodation thus become snares to trap the unwary. When the

41. Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in Friedrich, ed., p. 442.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 446.

43. Cordell Hull, Radio Address, 9 April 1944, excerpted in Norman Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1977), p. 172.

Soviets refuse to negotiate, they are plotting a world takeover. When they seek to negotiate, they are plotting even more insidiously. This extreme lack of public respect or trust is one of the major features that distinguishes relations between liberal and nonliberal societies from relations among liberal societies.

At the same time, lack of public trust constrains social and economic exchanges. Commercial interdependence can produce conflict as well as welfare when a society becomes dependent on foreign actions it cannot control. Among liberal societies the extent and variety of commercial exchanges guarantee that a single conflict of interest will not shape an entire relationship. But between liberal and nonliberal societies, these exchanges, because they are limited for security considerations, do not provide a counterweight to interstate political tension nor do they offer the variety that offsets the chance that a single conflict of interest will define an entire relationship.

Furthermore, the institutional heritage of liberal regimes—representation and division of powers—opens avenues for special interests to shape policy in ways contrary to prudent diplomacy. As George Kennan has noted, this form of government “goes far to rule out the privacy, the flexibility, and the promptness and incisiveness of decision and action, which have marked the great imperial powers of the past and which are generally necessary to the conduct of an effective world policy by the rulers of a great state.”<sup>44</sup> And these features may be compounded by the incentives for exaggerated claims that competitive electoral politics tends to encourage. The loss of these attributes is not harmful to interliberal relations (in fact, their absence is more likely to be beneficial), but the ills of ready access to foreign policy created by representation and the division of power multiply when a lack of trust is combined with the limited economic and social connection of extra-liberal relations. Together they promote an atmosphere of tension and a lobby for discord that can play havoc with both strategic choice and moral intent.

These three traits affect liberal relations both with powerful nonliberal states and with weak nonliberal societies, though in differing ways.

In relations with *powerful* nonliberal states the consequences of these three features have been missed opportunities to pursue the negotiation of arms reduction and arms control when it has been in the mutual

44. George F. Kennan, *A Cloud of Danger* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977), p. 4.

strategic interest and the failure to construct wider schemes of accommodation that are needed to supplement arms control. Prior to the outbreak of World War I, this is the charge that Lord Sanderson levelled against Sir Eyre Crowe in Sanderson's response to Crowe's famous memorandum on the state of British relations with Germany.<sup>45</sup> Sanderson pointed out that Crowe interpreted German demands to participate in the settlement of international disputes and to have a "place in the sun" (colonies), of a size not too dissimilar to that enjoyed by the other great powers, as evidence of a fundamental aggressiveness driving toward world domination. Crowe may well have perceived an essential feature of Wilhelmine Germany, and Sanderson's attempt to place Germany in the context of other rising powers (bumptious but not aggressively pursuing world domination) may have been naive. But the interesting thing to note is less the conclusions reached than Crowe's chain of argument and evidence. He rejects continued accommodation (appeasement) with Germany not because he shows that Germany was more bumptious than France and not because he shows that Germany had greater potential as a world hegemon than the United States, which he does not even consider in this connection. Instead he is (legitimately) perplexed by the real uncertainty of German foreign policy and by its "erratic, domineering, and often frankly aggressive spirit" which accords with the well-known personal characteristics of "the present Ruler of Germany."

Similar evidence of fundamental suspicion appears to characterize U.S. diplomacy toward the Soviet Union. In a fascinating memorandum to President Wilson written in 1919, Herbert Hoover (then one of Wilson's advisers), recommended that the President speak out against the danger of "world domination" the "Bolsheviki"—a "tyranny that is the negation of democracy"—posed to free peoples. Rejecting military intervention as excessively costly and likely to "make us a party in reestablishing the reactionary classes in their economic domination over the lower classes," he proposed a "relief program" designed to undercut some of the popular appeal the Bolsheviks were garnering both in the Soviet Union and abroad. Although acknowledging that the evidence was not yet clear, he concluded: "If the militant features of Bolshevism were drawn in colors with their true parallel with Prussianism as an attempt at world domination

45. Memoranda by Mr. Eyre Crowe, 1 January 1907, and by Lord Sanderson, 25 February 1907, in G. P. Gooch et al., eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914*, 3 (London: HMSO, 1928), pp. 397–431.

that we do not stand for, it would check the fears that today haunt all men's minds." (The actual U.S. intervention in the Soviet Union was limited to supporting anti-Bolshevik Czechoslovak soldiers in Siberia and to protecting military supplies in Murmansk from German seizure.)<sup>46</sup>

In the postwar period, and particularly following the Korean War, U.S. diplomacy equated the "international Communist movement" (all communist states and parties) with "Communist imperialism" and with a domestic tyranny in the U.S.S.R. that required a cold war contest and international subversion as means of legitimizing its own police state. John Foster Dulles most clearly expressed this conviction, together with his own commitment to a strategy of "liberation," when he declared: ". . . we shall never have a secure peace or a happy world so long as Soviet communism dominates one third of all the peoples that there are, and is in the process of trying at least to extend its rule to many others."<sup>47</sup>

Liberalism has also encouraged a tendency to misread communist threats in the Third World. Since communism is seen as inherently aggressive, Soviet military aid "destabilizes" parts of Africa in Angola and the Horn; the West protects allies. Thus the People's Republic of China was a "Soviet Manchukuo" while Diem was the "Winston Churchill of Asia." Both the actual (and unstable) dependence of these regimes on their respective superpowers and anticolonialism, the dominant force of the region, were discounted.

Most significantly, opportunities for splitting the Communist bloc along cleavages of strategic national interest were delayed. Burdened with the war in Vietnam, the United States took ten years to appreciate and exploit the strategic opportunity of the Sino-Soviet split. Even the signal strategic, "offensive" success of the early cold war, the defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc, did not receive the wholehearted welcome that a strategic

46. Herbert Hoover to President Wilson, 28 March 1919, excerpted in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, II, ed. Thomas Paterson (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1978), p. 95.

Fear of Bolshevism may have been one of the factors precluding a liberal alliance with the Soviet Union in 1938 against Nazi aggression. But the connection liberals draw between domestic tyranny and foreign aggression may also operate in reverse. When the Nazi threat to the survival of liberal states did require a liberal alliance with the Soviet Union, Stalin became for a short period the liberal press's "Uncle Joe."

47. U.S. Senate, *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Nomination of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State Designate*, 15 January 1953, 83rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1953), pp. 5-6.

assessment of its importance would have warranted.<sup>48</sup> Both relationships, with Yugoslavia and China, become subject to alternating, largely ideologically derived, moods: visions of exceptionalism (they were “less ruthless,” more organic to the indigenous, traditional culture) sparred with bouts of liberal soul-searching (“we cannot associate ourselves with a totalitarian state”). And these unresolved tensions continue to affect the strategic relationship with both communist independents.

A purely Realist focus on the balance of power would lead one to expect the hostility between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, that emerged preeminent after the defeats of Nazi-Germany and Japan. Furthermore, a bipolar rivalry raises perceptions of zero-sum conflict (what one gains the other must lose) and consequently a tendency toward overreaction. And liberalism is just one of many ideologies prone to ideological crusades and domestic “witch hunts.”<sup>49</sup> But, Realists have no reason to anticipate the hesitation of the United States in exploiting

48. Thirty-three divisions, the withdrawal of the Soviet bloc from the Mediterranean, political disarray in the Communist movement: these advantages called out for a quick and friendly response. An effective U.S. ambassador in place to present Tito's position to Washington, the public character of the expulsion from the Cominform (June 1948), and a presidential administration in the full flush of creative statesmanship (and an electoral victory) also contributed to Truman's decision to rescue Yugoslavia from the Soviet embargo by providing trade and loans (1949).

Nonetheless (according to Yugoslav sources), this crisis was also judged to be an appropriate moment to put pressure on Yugoslavia to resolve the questions of Trieste and Carinthia, to cut its support for the guerrillas in Greece, *and* to repay prewar (prerevolutionary) Yugoslav debts compensating the property owners of nationalized mines and land. Nor did Yugoslavia's strategic significance exempt it from inclusion among the countries condemned as “Captive Nations” (1959) or secure most-favored-nation trade status in the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. Ideological anticommunism and the porousness of the American political system to lobbies combined (according to Kennan, ambassador to Yugoslavia at that time) to add these inconvenient burdens to a crucial strategic relationship. (John C. Campbell, *Tito's Separate Road* [New York: Council on Foreign Relations/Harper and Row, 1967], pp. 18–27; Sucozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, in Vladimir Dedijer, *The Battle Stalin Lost* [New York: Viking, 1970], p. 268; George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1950-1963* [Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972], chap. 12.)

49. Like the *original* crusades (an earlier instance of transcendental foreign policy), the first were expeditions that created strategic littorals (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland in 1918 to 1920 for Antioch and Jerusalem): the second and third (1947 to 1949 for the crusades of the monarchs) new logistical reinforcements, or anticommunism in Europe; the fourth (the crossing of the 38th Parallel for Constantinople) was a strategic diversion. A McCarthyite (Albigensian) crusade at home followed. The fifth and sixth crusades extended the range of the conflict to the Third World (for Damietta); and later crusades were excuses for reequipping armies.



divisions in the Communist bloc and in forming strategic relationships with the USSR's communist rivals. U.S. cold war policy cannot be explained without reference to U.S. liberalism. Liberalism creates both the hostility to communism, not just to Soviet power, and the crusading ideological bent of policy. Liberals do not merely distrust what they do; we dislike what they are—public violators of human rights. And to this view, *laissez faire* liberals contribute antisocialism and social democratic liberals add a campaign for democracy.

One would think this confused record of policy would have produced a disaster in the East-West balance of forces. Squandered opportunities to negotiate East-West balances of interest and erratic policy should have alienated the United States' allies and dissipated its strategic resources. But other factors mitigated liberal confusion and crusades. Communist nuclear weapons and state power dictated prudence, and mutual survival has called for detente. The liberal alliance was deeply rooted in the pacific union and almost impervious to occasional crises over alliance policy toward the Soviet Union. And the productivity of market economies provided resources that could be mobilized to sustain the strategic position of the liberal West despite a confusion of aims and strategy.

Dilemmas and disasters are also associated with liberal foreign policy toward *weak*, nonliberal states; no greater spirit of accommodation or tolerance for noninterventionist sovereignties informs liberal policy toward the many weak, nonliberal states in the Third World. Indeed, liberalism's record in the Third World is in many respects worse than in East-West relations, for here power is added to confusion. This problem affects both conservative liberals and welfare liberals, but the two can be distinguished by differing styles of intervention.<sup>50</sup>

Both liberal strains appear congenitally confused in analyzing and in prescribing for situations of intervention. The liberal dictum in favor of nonintervention does not hold. Respecting a nonliberal state's state rights to noninterference requires ignoring the violations of rights they inflict on their own populations. Addressing the rights of individuals in the Third World requires ignoring the rights of states to be free of foreign intervention. Bouts of one attitude replace bouts of the other; but since the

50. See Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), for an interesting analysis of the impact of liberal ideology on American foreign aid policy, esp. chaps. 3 and pp. 313–23.

legitimacy of the nonliberal state is discounted, the dominant tendency leads toward interventionism.

A liberal imperialism that promotes liberalism neither abroad nor at home was one result of this dilemma. Protecting “native rights” from “native” oppressors, and protecting universal rights of property and settlement from local transgressions, introduced especially liberal motives for imperial rule. Kant’s right of universal hospitality justifies nothing more than the right to visit and exchange. Other liberals have been prepared to justify much more. Some argue that there is a universal right of settlement under which those who cannot earn a living in their own countries have a right to force others—particularly nomads and tribal hunters—to cede parts of their territory for more intensive settlement. J. S. Mill justifies even more coercive treatment of what he calls the “barbarous nations.” They do not have the rights of civilized nations, “except a right to such treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them for becoming one.” He justifies this imperial education for “barbarous” nations, while requiring nonintervention among “civilized” nations, because the former are not capable of reciprocating in the practice of liberal rights, and reciprocity is the foundation of liberal morality.<sup>51</sup>

Ending the slave trade destabilized nineteenth-century West African oligarchies, yet encouraging “legitimate trade” required protecting the property of European merchants; declaring the illegitimacy of suttee or of domestic slavery also attacked local cultural traditions that had sustained the stability of indigenous political authority. Europeans settling in sparsely populated areas destroyed the livelihood of tribes that relied

51. See Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Pt II, chap. 30, and Pt I, chap. 15. This right is discussed in Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 46. Mill’s remarks on colonialism are in “A Few Words on Nonintervention,” pp. 377–79, and in “Civilization” he distinguishes “civilized” nations from “barbarous” nations, not on racial or biological grounds but on the basis of what our contemporary scholars now call socioeconomic modernization or development. Mill declared, “Their minds are not capable of so great an effort [as reciprocity], nor their will sufficiently under the influence of distant motives.” Both essays are in J. S. Mill, *Essays on Literature and Society*, ed. with an introduction by J. B. Schneewind (New York: Collier, 1965). Perhaps the most interesting memorial to liberal imperialism is the inscription, written by Macaulay, on the base of Lord William Bentinck’s statue in Calcutta: “He abolished cruel rites; he effaced humiliating distinctions; he gave liberty to the expression of public opinion; his constant study was to elevate the intellectual and moral character of the natives committed to his charge” (cf. Mill). It is excerpted in Earl Cromer, *Ancient and Modern Imperialism* (London: Longmans, 1910), p. 67.

on hunting. The tribes, quite defensively, retaliated in force; the settlers called for imperial protection.<sup>52</sup> The protection of cosmopolitan liberal rights thus bred a demand for imperial rule that violated the equality of American Indians, Africans, and Asians. In practice, once the exigencies of ruling an empire came into play, liberal imperialism resulted in the oppression of “native” liberals seeking self-determination in order to maintain imperial security: to avoid local chaos and the intervention of another imperial power attempting to take advantage of local disaffection.

Thus nineteenth-century liberals, such as Gladstone, pondered whether Egypt’s protonationalist Arabi rebellion (1881–82) was truly liberal nationalist (they discovered it was not) before intervening to protect strategic lifelines to India, commerce, and investment.<sup>53</sup> Britain’s Liberal Party faced similar dilemmas in managing Ireland; they erratically oscillated between coercion and reform. These foreign disasters contributed to the downfall of the Liberal Party as Parliament in 1886 chose to be ruled by a more aristocratic and stable Conservative Party. The Conservatives did pursue a steadier course of consistent coercion in Ireland and Egypt, yet in their effort to maintain a paramountcy in southern Africa they too were swept away in a campaign to protect the civic and property rights of

52. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. I (New York: Vintage, 1945), p. 351. De Tocqueville describes how European settlement destroys the game; the absence of game reduces the Indians to starvation. Both then exercise their rights to self-defense. But the colonists are able to call in the power of the imperial government. Palmerston once declared that he would never employ force to promote purely private interests—commercial or settlement. He also declared that he would faithfully protect the lives and liberty of English subjects. In circumstances such as those de Tocqueville described, Palmerston’s distinctions were meaningless. See Kenneth Bourne, *Palmerston: The Early Years* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 624–26. Other colonial settlements and their dependence on imperial expansion are examined in Ronald Robinson, “Non-European Foundations of Imperialism,” in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, eds., *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London: Longmans, 1972).

53. Gladstone had proclaimed his support for the equal rights of all nations in his Midlothian Speeches. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt served as a secret agent in Egypt keeping Gladstone informed of the political character of Arabi’s movement. The liberal dilemma—were they intervening against genuine nationalism or a military adventurer (Arabi)?—was best expressed in Joseph Chamberlain’s memorandum to the Cabinet, 21 June 1882, excerpted in J. L. Garvin and J. Amery, *Life of Joseph Chamberlain* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1935) 1, p. 448. And see Peter Mansfield, *The British in Egypt* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), chaps. 2–3; Ronald Hyam, *Britain’s Imperial Century: 1815–1914* (London: Batsford, 1976), chap. 8; and Robert Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

British settlers (*uitlanders*) in the Boer's theocratic republics. These dilemmas of liberal imperialism are also reflected in U.S. imperialism in the Caribbean where, for example, following the Spanish-American War of 1898, Article III of the Platt Amendment gave the United States the "right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. . . ."54

The record of liberalism in the nonliberal world is not solely a catalogue of disasters. The North American West and the settlement colonies—Australia and New Zealand—represent a successful transplant of liberal institutions, albeit in a temperate, underpopulated, and then depopulated environment and at the cost of Indian and aborigine rights. Similarly, the twentieth-century expansion of liberalism into less powerful nonliberal areas has also had some striking successes. The forcible liberalization of Germany and Japan following World War II and the long covert financing of liberal parties in Italy are the more significant instances of successful transplant. Covert financing of liberalism in Chile and occasional diplomatic *démarches* to nudge aside military threats to noncommunist democratic parties (as in Peru in 1962, South Korea in 1963, and the Dominican Republic in 1962<sup>55</sup> and again in 1978) illustrate policies which, though less successful, were directed toward liberal goals. These particular postwar liberal successes also are the product of special circumstances: the existence of a potential liberal majority, temporarily

54. On Ireland and its relation to British parties, Conor Cruise O'Brien, *Parnell and His Party, 1880–1890* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); on South Africa, G.H.L. LeMay, *British Supremacy in South Africa 1899–1907* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). A good representative of liberal attitudes on force and intervention is the following comment by Vice Admiral Humphrey Smith:

"I don't think we thought much about war with a big W.. We looked on the Navy more as a World Police Force than as a war-like institution. We considered that our job was to safeguard law and order throughout the world—safeguard civilization, put out fires on shore, and act as guide, philosopher, and friend to the merchant ships of all nations." Vice Admiral Humphrey Smith, *A Yellow Admiral Remembers* (London, 1932), p. 54 in Donald C. Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defence: 1870–1914* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), p. 47.

The Platt Amendment is excerpted in *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy*, ed. Thomas Paterson (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1978) I, 328.

55. During the Alliance for Progress era in Latin America, the Kennedy Administration supported Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic in 1962. See also William P. Bundy, "Dictatorships and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 54, no. 1 (October 1975).

suppressed, which could be reestablished by outside aid or unusually weak oligarchic, military, or communist opponents.<sup>56</sup>

Elsewhere in the postwar period, when the United States sought to protect liberals in the Third World from the “communist threat,” the consequences of liberal foreign policy on the nonliberal society often became far removed from the promotion of individual rights. Intervening against “armed minorities” and “enemies of free enterprise” meant intervening for other armed minorities, some sustaining and sustained by oligarchies, others resting on little more than U.S. foreign aid and troops. Indigenous liberals simply had too narrow a base of domestic support.

To the conservative liberals, the alternatives are starkly cast: Third World authoritarians with allegiance to the liberal, capitalist West or “Communists” subject to the totalitarian East (or leftist nationalists who even if elected are but a slippery stepping stone to totalitarianism).<sup>57</sup> Conservative liberals are prepared to support the allied authoritarians. The communists attack property in addition to liberty, thereby provoking conservative liberals to covert or overt intervention, or “dollar-diplomacy” imperialism. The interventions against Mossadegh in Iran, Arbenz in Guatemala, Allende in Chile, and against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua appear to fall into this pattern.<sup>58</sup>

To the social welfare liberals, the choice is never so clear. Aware of the need to intervene to democratize the distribution of social power and resources, they tend to have more sympathy for social reform. This can produce on the part of “radical” welfare liberals a more tolerant policy toward the attempts by reforming autocracies to redress inequalitarian distributions of property in the Third World. This more complicated welfare-liberal assessment can itself be a recipe for more extensive inter-

56. See Samuel Huntington, “Human Rights and American Power,” *Commentary*, September 1981, and George Quester, “Consensus Lost,” *Foreign Policy* 40 (Fall 1980), for argument and examples of the successful export of liberal institutions in the postwar period.

57. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” *Commentary* 68 (November 1979): 34–45. In 1851 the liberal French historian Guizot made a similar argument in a letter to Gladstone urging that Gladstone appreciate that the despotic government of Naples was the best guarantor of liberal law and order then available. Reform, in Guizot’s view, meant the unleashing of revolutionary violence. (Philip Magnus, *Gladstone* [New York: Dutton, 1964], p. 100.)

58. Richard Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World* (New York: Meridian, 1968), chap. 10; and on Nicaragua, see *The New York Times*, 11 March 1982, for a description of the training, direction, and funding (\$20 million) of anti-Sandinista guerrillas by the United States.

vention. The large number of conservative oligarchs or military bureaucracies with whom the conservative liberal is well at home are not so congenial to the social welfare liberal; yet the communists are still seen as enemies of liberty. They justify more extensive intervention first to discover, then to sustain, Third World social democracy in a political environment that is either barely participatory or highly polarized. Thus Arthur Schlesinger recalls President Kennedy musing shortly after the assassination of Trujillo (former dictator of the Dominican Republic), “There are three possibilities in descending order of preference, a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime [by his followers] or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we can’t really renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third.” Another instance of this approach was President Carter’s support for the land reforms in El Salvador, which was explained by one U.S. official in the following analogy: “There is no one more conservative than a small farmer. We’re going to be breeding capitalists like rabbits.”<sup>59</sup>

Thus liberal policy toward the Third World state often fails to promote individual rights. Its consequences on liberalism at home may also be harmful. As Hobson pointed out in his study of imperialism, imperial security and imperial wars may enhance in the short run the position of nonliberal domestic forces, such as the military, and introduce in the longer run issues into the political debate, such as security, that raise the role of nonliberal coalitions of conservative oligarchy or technocracy.<sup>60</sup>

One might account for many of these liberal interventions in the Third World by geopolitical competition, the Realists’ calculus of the balance of power, or by the desire to promote the national economic interests of the United States. The attempt to avoid Third World countries coming under the hegemony of the USSR or to preserve essential sources of raw materials are alternative interpretations of much of the policy attributed to liberalism which on their face are plausible. Yet these interventions are publicly justified in the first instance as attempts to preserve a “way of life”: to defend freedom and private enterprise. The threat has been

59. Arthur Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 769, and quoted in Richard Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution* (New York: Meridian, 1968), p. 158. And for the U.S. official’s comment on the Salvadoran land reform, see L. Simon and J. Stephen, *El Salvador Land Reform 1980-1981* (Boston, MA: Oxfam-America, 1981), p. 38. See Zolberg, n. 4, above.

60. John Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), pp. 145-47.

defined as “Communism,” not just “Sovietism” or “economic nationalism.” Expectations of being punished electorally, should they abandon groups they had billed as democratic allies contributed to the reluctance of U.S. politicians to withdraw from Vietnam. The consistent policy of seeking a legitimating election, however unpromising the circumstances for it (as in Vietnam), reflects the same liberal source.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, few communist or socialist Third World states actually do seek to cordon off their markets or raw materials from the liberal world economy. And the radical movements, first and foremost anticolonialist, against which the United States has intervened, have not been simple proxies for the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, by geopolitical considerations alone, the large interventions may have been counterproductive. The interventions have confirmed or enhanced the coherence of the Soviet bloc as the Chinese Civil War (U.S. logistical support for the KMT) and the drive to the Yalu of the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Angolan War served to increase the dependence of the PRC, Vietnam, and Angola on the USSR. In each of these interventions, U.S. geopolitical interests might have been served best by supporting the communist side and encouraging its separation from the Soviet bloc. But because the United States failed to distinguish communism from Soviet power, this separation was impossible. Had the Soviet Union been a capitalist authoritarian superpower, geopolitical logic also would have led the United States to intervene against the expansion of its bloc.<sup>62</sup> But the United States intervenes against the expansion of communism regardless of geopolitical considerations just as it (along with Britain) did against Soviet communism following World War I.<sup>63</sup>

61. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1979). Frances Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake* (New York: Vintage/Random House, 1972), chap. 11, portrays the elections of 1967 in this way. Allan Goodman, *Politics in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), disagrees, but does find that the elections of 1971 fit this description.

62. Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971).

63. Although geopolitical anti-Sovietism and the effects of the two liberalisms complemented each other throughout the postwar period and together usually led to intervention; less frequently, geopolitics and liberalism worked together to restrain intervention. Once recognized, the defection of *established* Communist regimes such as Yugoslavia and China was welcomed, though neither defection was fully exploited. Both the geopolitical interest and the prospects of increased trade or development were served by Yugoslav and Chinese

Is the United States anticommunist because communism is the ideology adopted by the Soviet Union; or are liberals anti-Soviet because the Soviet Union is the headquarters of communism? In encouraging intervention, the imprudent vehemences of geopolitics and the liberalism cannot be clearly separated in a bipolar contest between a communist and a liberal superpower. Nonetheless, liberalism does appear to exacerbate intervention against weak nonliberals and hostility against powerful nonliberal societies.

## VII

A second manifestation of international liberalism outside the pacific union lies in a reaction to the excesses of interventionism. A mood of frustrated withdrawal—"a careless and supine complaisance"—affects policy toward strategically and economically important countries. Just as interventionism seems to be the typical failing of the liberal great power, so complaisance characterizes declined or not quite risen liberal states.<sup>64</sup> Representative legislatures may become reluctant to fund the military establishment needed to play a geopolitical role. Rational incentives for "free riding" on the extended defense commitments of the leader of the liberal alliance also induce this form of complaisance. During much of the nineteenth century, the United States informally relied upon the British fleet for many of its security needs. Today, the Europeans and the Japanese, according to some American strategic analysts, fail to bear their "fair" share of alliance burdens.

A different form of complaisance is charged by Realists who perceive ideologically based policies as self-indulgent. Oligarchic or authoritarian allies in the Third World do not find consistent support in a liberal policy that stresses human rights. They claim that the security needs of these

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separation from the Soviet bloc. In other instances this particular complementary restraint may have had less welcome effects. The most serious harm to American national economic interests inflicted in the postwar period was the OPEC embargo and price revolution of 1973–74. Geopolitical factors dictated no intervention because the Iranian "regional policeman" needed funds to purchase its arms. Conservative liberals rightly perceived no substantial attack on U.S. oil corporations. Welfare liberals had come to believe in improving the terms of trade for Third World exports, and oil appeared a good place to begin. None of these sources of restraint appear in quite the same light in 1982.

64. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), discusses the sources of change in the foreign policies of rising and declining hegemonies.



states are neglected, that they fail to obtain military aid or more direct support when they need it (the Shah's Iran, Humberto Romero's El Salvador, Somoza's Nicaragua, and South Africa). Equally disturbing from a Realist point of view, communist regimes are shunned even when a detente with them could further United States strategic interests (Cuba, Angola). Welfare liberals particularly shun the first group, while laissez faire liberals balk at close dealings with the second. In both cases the Realists note that our economic interests or strategic interests are slighted.<sup>65</sup>

## VIII

Lastly, both variants of liberalism raise dilemmas in North-South economic relations and particularly in the international distribution of property or income. Not expecting to have to resolve whether freedom of enterprise should extend to doing business with the followers of Marx and Lenin, conservative, laissez faire liberals have become incensed over the attractiveness to American and European corporations of profits made in the communist world. And the commitment of liberals—both social welfare and laissez faire liberals—to the efficiency and the political advantages of international free trade is severely tested by the inflow of low-cost imports from newly industrializing countries of the Third World. These imports threaten domestic industries, which tend to be politically active and affiliated with the extremes of conservative or welfare liberalism. Some of these have strongly resisted domestic, union organization (for reasons of cost) and thus strongly support domestic laissez faire, conservative liberalism (among these, most prominent are some textile firms). The welfare liberals face similar political dilemmas in their association with well-organized labor in related industries (for example, the

65. Kirkpatrick points out our neglect of the needs of the authoritarians, see n. 4. Theodore Lowi argues that Democratic and Republican policies toward the acquisition of bases in Spain reflected this dichotomy; "Bases in Spain" in *American Civil-Military Decisions*, ed. Harold Stein (University: The University of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 699. In other cases where both the geopolitical and the domestic orientation of a potential neutral might be influenced by U.S. aid, liberal institutions (representative legislatures) impose delay or public constraints and conditions on diplomacy that allow the Soviet Union to steal a march. Warren Christopher has suggested that this occurred in U.S. relations with Nicaragua in 1979. Warren Christopher, "Ceasefire Between the Branches," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, p. 998.

garment industry) or in industries just recently threatened by imports (for example, steel or autos).<sup>66</sup>

In addition, the welfare liberal faces international moral and domestic political dilemmas. If the disadvantaged are rightly the objects of social welfare, redistribution should be directed toward the vast preponderance of the world's poor who are in the Third and Fourth Worlds. Three arguments reveal facets of the moral and political problems welfare liberals face.

First, there is the obligation of humanitarian aid. Peter Singer has argued that the humanitarian obligation an individual has to rescue a drowning child from a shallow pool of water (when such a rescue would not require a sacrifice of something of comparable moral importance, for example, one's own life) should be extended to international aid to famine victims and the global poor.<sup>67</sup> Recently, Brian Barry has provided a strong defense against skepticism concerning this obligation.<sup>68</sup> But he concludes that, while it is hard to doubt that .25 percent of national income (the U.S. figure for foreign aid) is too low, there does not seem to be a clear limit on how much aid of the enormous amount needed is obligatory. One should add that since this aid is required by needy individuals (mostly) in the Third and Fourth Worlds and not clearly owed to their states, the logistics of distributing humanitarian aid will prove difficult. And since this aid is due from individuals in the wealthy North, a limitless personal obligation to the world's poor threatens a form of tyrannical morality. Nor is the burden easily shifted to liberal governments in the North. Political obstacles to taxing rich liberal societies for humanitarian aid are evident. The income of the American poor places them among the world's more advantaged few. But the demand for redistributing income from the United States to the world's poor meets two domestic barriers: the United States poor *within* the United States are clearly disadvantaged, and our dem-

66. On economic policy, and pressure groups, see J. J. Pincus, "Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs," *Journal of Political Economy* 83, August 1975, and L. Salamon and J. Siegfried, "Economic Power and Political Influence," *American Political Science Review* 71, September 1977.

67. Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 1, no. 3 (Spring 1972): 229-43.

68. Brian Barry, "Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective" in *Ethics, Economics, and the Law; Nomos XXIV*, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1982), chap. 11.

ocratic politics places the needs of disadvantaged voting citizens above those of more disadvantaged but foreign people.

The second and third problems arise with respect to claims to international redistribution based on obligations of justice. Both establishing a just global society and justly distributing resources in an unjust international society raise apparently insuperable barriers.

In cases of extreme inequality and political recalcitrance within a country, the welfare liberals find justifiable a developmental, redistributing dictatorship to equalize opportunity as a necessary foundation for a just liberal society.<sup>69</sup> The liberal justification for such a dictatorial redistribution on a national scale is that without it authentically democratic liberal politics and social economy are rendered ineffective. The enormous social inequalities of the international order might—however implausibly—suggest the same prescription should apply to the international order. But extended to global scale, this prescription runs up against a fundamental liberal constraint. It is not clear that an effective global, liberal polity can be formed. Kant regarded global sovereignty, whether liberal in aim or not, as equivalent to global tyranny due to the remoteness of the representation it would entail. If the maximum effective size of a legislature is about 500, a global constituency would have to be of the order of 8 million persons. Confederal solutions that mix direct and indirect elections further attenuate the political life of the citizen or they create the grounds for serious conflict between the local government and the remote confederation. In short, the redistribution that can be justified on liberal grounds does not stretch beyond liberal government. Since modern states may already be too large for effectively liberal politics, global government cannot be a liberal aim. Yet without the prospect of moral autonomy through representative government this form of international redistribution is not justified on liberal grounds.

The dilemma of justly redistributing income in an international society of independent states is addressed by Brian Barry. After rejecting “just requitals” (just prices) for past exploitation as being inadequate justice for poor societies lacking any resources whatsoever and after rejecting justice as “fair play” (reciprocal obligations) for being ill-suited to the minimally integrated international economy, he settles on justice as equal

69. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 352–53.

rights.<sup>70</sup> He follows Hart's argument that special rights (to property) presuppose general rights (to property) and that natural resources (or inherited endowments) cannot be justly acquired without consent. Without consent, all have an equal right to global resources. The contemporary rich countries, therefore, owe a share of their income or resources to poor countries. Moreover, they owe this share without the requirement that it be directed to the poorest in the poor countries, because the rich have no right to impose conditions on income or property to which all have an equal right. If rich countries can dispose of global income autonomously, poor countries should have the same right.<sup>71</sup>

There are two objections that I think should be made against accepting Barry's principle of indiscriminate interstate justice. First, if justice is determined by the equal rights of individuals to global resources or inheritances, then rich *countries* only acquire income justly when they acquire it justly from individuals (for example, by consent). Only just countries have rights over the autonomous disposition of national income. An unjust rich state has no right to dispose or hold income. A just rich country, conversely, has the right to dispose autonomously of national income, provided that national income represents its just share of global income. Any surplus is owed to *individuals* who are poor or to (just) poor states that have acquired a right to dispose of income or resources by the consent of their citizens. Neither unjust poor states nor unjust rich states should (by the argument of equal rights of individuals) have rights over global income. If there were justice among "thieves," it might call for distribution without condition from unjust rich states to unjust poor states. But there is no reason why that scheme should apply to the surplus of just rich states beyond that which they distribute to just poor states. Some form of trust for the global poor (for present lack of such an institution, perhaps the World Bank or UNICEF) seems a better recipient than an unjust poor state. An obligation of equal justice that requires, say, Norway or Sweden to tax its citizens to provide direct transfers to a

70. Barry, "Humanity and Justice," p. 234. For an exposition of the implications of a Rawlsian argument ("fair play") concerning international justice, see Charles Beitz, *op. cit.*, Part III. And for a criticism of the extension of Rawls's arguments to international justice, see Christopher Brewin, "Justice in International Relations," in *The Reason of States*, ed. Michael Donelan (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), pp. 151–52.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 248.

Somoza or a Duvalier in preference to funding the IDA of the World Bank or UNICEF is morally bizarre.<sup>72</sup>

The second objection reflects the residual insecurity of the contemporary order. As long as there is no guarantee of security, indiscriminate obligations of justice to redistribute income and resources (including redistribution to potential security threats) cannot be justified. Obliging Israel to tax itself for Syria, or Japan for China, or even the United States for Cuba threatens the rights of individuals within these states to promote their territorial integrity and political independence.

These two objections to the application of just redistribution should not apply within the pacific union. States within the liberal union do rest on consent and do not constitute threats to one another. Between the union's rich and poor members, obligations of justice to distribute global resources and income supplement humanitarian obligations applicable globally to aid the poor. (Of course, obstacles are daunting. Among them are how to raise international revenue in a just fashion; how to distribute this revenue in an efficient manner; and how to persuade democratic citizens to support a lengthy program when some mismanagement is likely and when strategic ties to authoritarian allies make competitive demands on the revenues they have become accustomed to raise for foreign purposes. These obstacles may even make a public recognition of the obligation unlikely, but that does not mean it should not be recognized.)

To counterbalance these costly dilemmas in relations between liberal and nonliberal states, liberalism has had two attractive programs. One is a human rights policy that counters the record of colonial oppression and addresses the ills of current domestic oppression in the Second and Third Worlds. The other is a policy of free trade and investment. But neither has had the impact it might have. The attraction of human rights has been tarnished by liberal practice in supporting dictatorships; complementarily, human rights holds little attraction to dictatorial governments in the Third World. The market has been tarnished by unequal bargain-

72. None of the points raised in the first objection to Barry's argument of international distribution devalue the right of nationality or justify liberal imperialism. Both nationality and property are national-state rights derived from the equal rights of individuals, but they are different. Nationality can only be enjoyed collectively, property can retain an individual form of appropriation. No international scheme of provision a global affiliation can substitute for nationality when the nation is the accepted center of loyalty; international provision of income to individuals can substitute for or bypass a corrupt state.

ing, and now that the bargaining has become more equal, by a mounting “new protectionism.”

Liberal principles and economic institutions retain their attractive potential even though they alone cannot satisfy Third World needs such as creating national unity or reducing social inequalities. Releasing this potential from the burden of liberal practice is a feat the liberal world has yet to accomplish.

Thus liberalism has achieved extraordinary success in relations among liberal states as well as exceptional failures in relations between liberal and nonliberal states. Both tendencies are fundamentally rooted in the operation of liberalism within and across national borders. Both are liberalism’s legacy in foreign affairs.

## IX

No country lives strictly according to its political ideology and few liberal states are as hegemonically liberal as the United States.<sup>73</sup> Even in the United States, certain interests and domestic actors derive their sense of legitimacy from sources other than liberalism. The state’s national security bureaucracy reflects an approach to politics among nations that focuses on other states, particularly threatening states. Its policies correspondingly tend to fall into the Realist, national interest frame of reference. Certain of the West European states and Japan have more syncretic and organic sources of a “real” national interest. But in the United States, and in other liberal states to a lesser degree, public policy derives its legitimacy from its concordance with liberal principles. Policies not rooted in liberal principles generally fail to sustain long term public support. I have argued that these principles are a firm anchor of the most successful zone of international peace yet established; but also a source of conflicted and confused foreign policy toward the nonliberal world. Improving policy toward the nonliberal world by introducing steady and long-run calculations of strategic and economic interest is likely to require political institutions that are inconsistent with both a liberal policy and a liberal alliance: for example, an autonomous executive branch or a

73. Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1953). The United States is one of the few liberal states both of whose leading political fractions (parties) are liberal. Others have shared or competitive fractions: aristocratic or statist-bureaucratic fractions contesting more centrally liberal fractions.

predominance of presidential and military actors in foreign policy so as to obtain flexible and rapid responses to changes in the strategic and economic environment. In peacetime, such “emergency” measures are unacceptable in a liberal democracy. Moreover, they would break the chain of stable expectations and the mesh of private and public channels of information and material lobbying that sustain the pacific union. In short, completely resolving liberal dilemmas may not be possible without threatening liberal success.

Therefore, the goal of concerned liberals must be to reduce the harmful impact of the dilemmas without undermining the successes. There is no simple formula for an effective liberal foreign policy. Its methods must be geared toward specific issues and countries. But liberal legacies do suggest guidelines for liberal policy making that contrast quite strikingly with the Realists’ advocacy of maximizing the national interest.

First, if “publicity” makes radically inconsistent policy impossible in a liberal republic, then policy toward the liberal and the nonliberal world should be guided by general liberal principles. Liberal policies thus must attempt to promote liberal principles abroad: to secure basic human needs, civil rights, and democracy, and to expand the scope and effectiveness of the world market economy. Important among these principles, Kant argued, are some of the “preliminary articles” from his treaty of perpetual peace: extending nonintervention by force in internal affairs of other states to nonliberal governments and maintaining a scrupulous respect for the laws of war.<sup>74</sup> These, as J. S. Mill argued, imply a right to support states threatened by external aggression and to intervene against foreign intervention in civil wars.<sup>75</sup> Furthermore, powerful and weak, hostile and friendly nonliberal states must be treated according to the *same* standards. There are no special geopolitical clients, no geopolitical enemies other than those judged to be such by liberal principles. This policy is as radical

74. See Kant’s “Preliminary Articles,” pp. 431–36; and for a contemporary application of liberal views that shares a number of positions with the policies suggested here, see Richard Ullman, “The Foreign World and Ourselves: Washington, Wilson, and the Democrats Dilemma,” *Foreign Policy*, Winter 75/76, and Stanley Hoffmann; *Duties Beyond Borders* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), chaps. 2–4. Michael Walzer in *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), has reformulated and revised the major liberal propositions concerning the justice of wars and justice in wars.

75. Interestingly, even a liberal imperialist of a Millian persuasion would now accept that the right to nonintervention should extend to the contemporary Third World. Since the criteria set forth in “Civilization” (commercialization, security) are now met by all nations, Mill would find that we no longer have “barbarous nations” requiring imperial rule.

in conception as it sounds. It requires abandoning the national interest and the balance of power as guidelines to policy. The interests of the United States must be consistent with its principles. We must have no liberal enemies and no unconditional alliances with nonliberal states.

Second, given contemporary conditions of economic interdependence, this policy could employ economic warfare to lead a liberal crusade against communism and against Third World authoritarians of the left or the right. It could also lead to a withdrawal into isolationism and a defense of only one principle: the right of the United States to territorial integrity and political independence. Both of these policies are consistent with liberal principles, but neither promotes security in a nuclear age nor enhances the prospects for meeting the needs of the poor and oppressed. To avoid the extremist possibilities of its abstract universalism, U.S. liberal policy must be further constrained by a geopolitical budget. Here the Realists' calculus of security provides a benchmark of survival and prudence from which a liberal policy that recognizes national security as a liberal right can navigate. This benchmark consists of prudent policies toward the most significant, indeed the only, strategic threat the United States faces—the USSR. Once the Realists set a prudent policy toward the USSR, the liberals can then take over again, defining more supportive and interdependent policies toward those countries more liberal than the USSR, and more constraining and more containing policies toward countries less liberal than the USSR.<sup>76</sup>

And third, specific features of liberal policy will be influenced by whether voting citizens choose to be governed by a *laissez faire* or by a social democratic administration. But both of these liberalisms should take into account more general guidelines to a prudent, liberal foreign policy—such as those that follow.

In relations with the USSR, a prudent set of policies calls for a frank acceptance of our political incapacity to sustain a successful reforming crusade. Instead mutually beneficial arrangements should be accepted to the extent they do not violate liberal principles or favor long-run Soviet interests over the long-run interests of the United States and the liberal

76. These points benefited from comments by Fouad Ajami, Thomas Farer, and Richard Ullman. For a recent example of a prudential argument for detente, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Detente Without Illusions," *New York Times*, 7 March 1983. And for a coherent exposition of a liberal foreign policy which has helped inform my views on this entire question, Marshall Cohen, "Toward a Liberal Foreign Policy," which will appear in *Liberalism Reconsidered*, ed. by D. MacLean and C. Mills (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983).



world. Arms control would be central to this as would the expansion of civilian trade. We would encounter difficulties when our liberal allies can gain economic benefits from trade deals (for example, the sale of computer technology) that might in the long run favor the USSR. These situations may be exceptionally difficult to resolve diplomatically since assessments of strategic advantage tend to be uncertain and since the particular nature of the benefits (say, sales of grain as opposed to sales of computers) can influence the assessment of the strategic risks entailed. Liberals will also need to ensure that ties of dependence on the USSR (such as the gas pipeline) are not a major constraint on liberal foreign policy by providing alternative sources (for example, uranium) for allies or by equalizing the import costs of energy and by assuring alternative sources in an emergency. Given the Soviet Union's capacity to respond to bottlenecks imposed by the West, there will be few occasions (fortunately for the coherence of the liberal alliance) when it can be clearly shown that an embargo would unambiguously hamper the Soviet Union and help the liberal alliance.<sup>77</sup>

In relations with the People's Republic of China, similar liberal principles permit trade that includes arms sales to a state no more restrictive of its subjects' liberty but much less restrictive of the liberty of foreign peoples than is the USSR. But strategic temptations toward a further alliance should be curbed. Such an alliance would backfire, perhaps disastrously, when liberal publics confront policymakers with the Chinese shadows of antiliberal rule.

Arms control, trade, and accommodation toward nonliberal Third World nations must first be measured against a prudent policy toward the Soviet Union and then should reflect the relative degrees of liberal principle that their domestic and foreign policies incorporate. Although our policy should be directed by liberal principles, it should free itself from the pretension that by acts of will and material benevolence we can replicate ourselves in the Third World. The liberal alliance should be prepared to have diplomatic and commercial relations as it does with the USSR with every state that is no more repressive of liberal rights than is the USSR. For example, North Korea and Mozambique might receive PRC level relations; Vietnam, with its foreign incursions, and Angola, with its in-

77. *The Economist Study* of Soviet technology, June 1981, and an extensive literature on the use of economic sanctions, including F. Holtzman and R. Portes, "Limits of Pressure," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1978.

ternal ethnic conflict, Soviet-level relations. Being one of the few states that deny the legal equality of its subjects, South Africa should be treated as Amin's Uganda and Pol Pot's Khmer Republic should have been, in a more containing fashion than is the USSR. No arms should be traded, investment should be restricted with a view to its impact on human rights, and trade should be limited to humanitarian items that do not contribute to the longevity of *apartheid*.

Elsewhere, the liberal world should be prepared to engage in regular trade and investment with all Third World states no more restrictive of liberty than is the PRC, and this could include the sale of arms not sensitive to the actual defense of the liberal world in regard to the USSR. Furthermore, the liberal world should take additional measures of aid to favor Third World states attempting to address the basic needs of their own populations and seeking to preserve and expand the roles of the market and democratic participation. Much of the potential success of this policy rests on an ability to preserve a liberal market for Third World growth; for the market is the most substantial source of Third World accommodation with a liberal world whose past record includes imperial oppression. To this should be added mutually beneficial measures designed to improve Third World economic performance. Export earnings insurance, export diversification assistance, and technical aid are among some of these. (And social democrats will need to take steps that begin to address the humanitarian obligations of international aid and the limited obligations of international justice rich countries have to poor individuals and to [just] poor countries.)

Liberals should persevere in attempts to keep the world economy free from destabilizing, protectionist intrusions. Although intense economic interdependence generates conflicts, it also helps to sustain the material well-being underpinning liberal societies and to promise avenues of development to Third World states with markets that are currently limited by low income. Discovering ways to manage interdependence when rapid economic development has led to industrial crowding (at the same time as it retains massive numbers of the world's population in poverty) will call for difficult economic adjustments at home and institutional innovations in the world economy. These innovations may even require more rather than less explicit regulation of the domestic economy and more rather than less planned dis-integration of the international economy. Under these circumstances, liberals will need to ensure that those suf-

fering losses, such as from market disruption or restriction, do not suffer a permanent loss of income or exclusion from world markets. Furthermore, to prevent these emergency measures from escalating into a spiral of isolationism, liberal states should undertake these innovations only by international negotiation and only when the resulting agreements are subject to a regular review by all the parties.<sup>78</sup>

Above all, liberal policy should strive to preserve the pacific union of similarly liberal societies. It is not only currently of immense strategic value (being the political foundation of both NATO and the Japanese alliance); it is also the single best hope for the evolution of a peaceful world. Liberals should be prepared, therefore, to defend and formally ally with authentically liberal, democratic states that are subject to threats or actual instances of external attack or internal subversion.

Strategic and economic Realists are likely to judge this liberal foreign policy to be either too much of a commitment or too little. The Realists may argue that through a careful reading of the past we can interpret in a clear fashion a ranked array of present strategic and economic interests. Strategically beneficial allies, whatever their domestic system, should be supported. The purposes of our power must be to maximize our present power. Global ecologists and some on the left claim an ability to foresee future disasters that we should be preparing for now by radical institutional reforms.

But liberals have always doubted our ability to interpret the past or predict the future accurately and without bias. Liberalism has been an optimistic ideology of a peculiarly skeptical kind. Liberals assume individuals to be both self-interested and rationally capable of accommodating their conflicting interests. They have held that principles such as rule under law, majority rule, and the protection of private property that follow from mutual accommodation among rational, self-interested people are the best guide to present policy. These principles preclude taking advantage of every opportunity of the present. They also discount what might turn out to have been farsighted reform. The implicit hope of liberals is that the principles of the present will engender accommodating behavior

78. These and similar policies can be found in Fred Hirsch and Michael Doyle, and in C. Fred Bergsten et al., "The Reform of International Institutions," and Richard N. Cooper et al., "Towards a Renovated International System" (Triangle Papers 11 and 14), both in *Trilateral Commission Task Force Reports: 9-14* (New York: New York University Press, 1978).

that avoids the conflicts of the past and reduces the threats of the future. The gamble has not always paid off in the past (as in accepting a Sudeten separatism). It certainly is not guaranteed to work in the future (for example, in controlling nuclear proliferation or pollution). But liberalism cannot *politically* sustain nonliberal policies. Liberal policies rest upon a different premise. They are policies that can be accepted by a liberal world in good faith and sustained by the electorates of liberal democracies.

In responding to the demands of their electorates, liberal states must also ascribe responsibility for their policies to their citizenry. The major costs of a liberal foreign policy are borne at home. Not merely are its military costs at the taxpayers' expense, but a liberal foreign policy requires adjustment to a less controlled international political environment—a rejection of the status quo. The home front becomes the front line of liberal strategy. Tolerating more foreign change requires a greater acceptance of domestic change. Not maintaining an imperial presence in the Persian Gulf calls for a reduction of energy dependence. Accepting the economic growth of the Third World may require trade and industrial adjustment. The choice is one between preserving liberalism's material legacy of the current world order at the cost of liberal principles or of finding ways of adjusting to a changing world order that protect liberal principles.

#### FIRST ADDITION

Kant argued that the natural evolution of world politics and economics would drive mankind inexorably toward peace by means of a widening of the pacific union of liberal republican states. In 1795 this was a startling prediction. In 1981, almost two hundred years later, we can see that he appears to have been correct. The pacific union of liberal states has progressively widened. Liberal states have yet to become involved in a war with one another. International peace is not a utopian ideal to be reached, if at all, in the far future; it is a condition that liberal states have already experienced in their relations with each other. Should this history sustain a hope for global peace?

Kant did not assume that pacification would be a steady progress; he anticipated many setbacks. Periods of history since 1795, among them the Napoleonic Wars and the two World Wars, have fully justified his pessimism. The future may have more fundamental setbacks in store.

First, human beings have been driven into forming liberal republics by the pressures of internal and external war. Discord has thus created the essential institutions on which liberal pacification rests. But the Kantian logic of war may find itself supplanted by a nuclear logic of destruction. However persuasive a moral foundation for peace a global wasteland might make, it would make a poor material foundation for its survivors. Indeed, the erratic and lengthy process of educative wars that Kant anticipated appears impossible under nuclear conditions. Long before the nations completed their process of graduation into republicanism, a nuclear wasteland might well have reduced them to barbarism. Yet nuclear logic also calls forth a sense of caution (the balance of terror) that could accelerate the process of graduation into peace even before republics established a homogeneous governance of the world.<sup>79</sup>

Second, Kant assumed that republics formed an endpoint of political evolution: “the highest task nature has set mankind.” The increasing number, the longevity, the spread of republics to all continents and to all cultures that are free from foreign domination lend credence to his judgment. Nonetheless, a great and long depression or a runaway inflation could create the conditions that lead to authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Having access to the new technology of surveillance to root out domestic dissidents, such regimes might prove difficult for their populations to dislodge. And nuclear deterrence might provide them with external security.<sup>80</sup>

Third, Kant relied upon international commerce to create ties of mutual advantage that would help make republics pacific. But past technological progress that lowered the costs of transport and that developed rapidly and unevenly—together encouraging international trade—could change direction. Instead, a trade-saving path of technical progress such as emerged in the Roman Empire could reemerge. If the technological progress of transportation develops less quickly than the spread of manufacturing technology, if current trends toward resource-saving technology continue, if economic development tends to equalize capital-labor ratios, or if states choose economic stability over growth and prefer domestic manufacturing, agriculture and services to trade, then world trade could de-

79. For a thorough survey of these issues see Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

80. Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 229. Senate Judiciary Committee, *Committee Print: Surveillance Technology* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976).

cline even as global economic development continued. The educative force of international exchange would thereby decline.<sup>81</sup>

But, if we assume that these setbacks do not emerge and that, as Kant argued, a steady worldwide pressure for a liberal peace continues, can the past record of liberalism's expansion lead us to any sense of when it might ultimately triumph?

## SECOND ADDITION

### *Extrapolating Nature's Secret Design*

Kant's argument implies two dynamic paths toward peace: one transnational, the other international. The first operates through the ties of trade, cultural exchange, and political understanding that together both commit existing republics to peace and, by inference, give rise to individualistic demands in nonrepublics whose resolution requires the establishment of republican government. The second operates through the pressure of insecurity and of actual war that together engender republican governments—the domestic constitutional foundations of peace. While the second appears fundamental, the first is not merely dependent. The transnational track conveys the impression of a global society expanding from one country to the next, encompassing an ever larger zone of peace, and yet working on each society in an independent even though connected and similar fashion. The international track—war—is basically a set of epidemics become, in the larger perspective, endemic to the international state of war. It operates conjointly, on one because it is operating on another. It is inherently relational and interdependent.

In all likelihood, the past rate of progress in the expansion of the pacific union has been a complex and inseparable combination of the effects of both tracks. But if we imagine that progress had been achieved solely by one track or the other, we can deduce the outer limits of the underlying logics of the transnational and international progresses toward peace.

81. In this connection, an interesting hypothesis that either a frontier, a rapidly growing industrial sector, or an improved educational system are the only hopes for preserving an essential foundation for modern democracies has been advanced by Marion Levy, "A Revision of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft Categories and Some Aspects of the Interdependencies of Minority and Host Systems," in *Internal War*, ed. Harry Eckstein (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1964), p. 261.

TABLE 3  
THE PACIFIC UNION

	1800	1800– 1850	1850– 1900	1900– 1945	1945– (1980)
Number of Liberal Regimes	3	8	13	29	49
Transnational Track		+5	+5	+16	+20
International Track		>2x	<2x	>2x	<2x

The second row represents the transnational track of an underlying arithmetic widening of the zone of peace accomplished by linking republics together and creating pressures, incentives, and ideals leading more nations to become republican. An expanding rate of absolute progress reveals itself as the base develops each century—in the nineteenth adding 5 per 50 years, in the twentieth more than tripling to approximately 18 (i.e.,  $\frac{16}{2} + 20$ ) per 50 years. Thus if the rate triples again in the twenty-first century to approximately 50 liberal states per 50 years and if the state order remains fixed at roughly 150 states, the pacific union will not become global until, at the earliest, the year 2101. The third row, a geometric progression that corresponds to the interdependent logic of war, may be the better indicator of Kantian progress. There republics more than double in number during warlike periods such as 1800 to 1850 or 1900 to 1950, less than double in more pacific times (1850–1900 or perhaps 1945–2000, when there have so far been many wars, but no “great” or world wars involving many states akin to the Napoleonic War or World Wars I and II). Thus if we assume continuing preparation for war and petty wars—akin to the period 1850 to 1900—and a similar ratio of expansion (13/8) then global peace should be anticipated, at the earliest, in 2113.<sup>82</sup>

Of course, this pacific calculus further assumes that, as Kant required in his “Second Supplement,” a “Secret Article” be included in the treaty

82. In the last sentence of “Perpetual Peace,” Kant expressed a hope for a similar rate of expansion of the pacific union. “It is to be hoped that the periods in which equal progress is achieved will become shorter and shorter.” Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” in Friedrich, p. 476.

for a Perpetual Peace: "The maxims of the philosophers concerning the conditions of the possibility of public peace shall be consulted by the states which are ready to go to war." To this proviso, we need add that the greater complexity of international relations today calls for economists, political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists as well as natural scientists to add their advice to that of the philosophers. This increase in the costs of consultation would, however, be fully justified if even a small war or two were thereby indefinitely delayed, wars being so much more destructive than they were in Kant's day.

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