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between myself and other states, although I recognize^j no supreme legislative power which secures my right to me and to which I secure its right," it is not understandable on what I want to base my confidence in my right, unless it is the surrogate of the civil social union, namely the free federalism that reason must connect necessarily with the concept of the right of nations if this is to retain any meaning at all.

8:357 The concept of the right of nations as that of the right *to go to war* is, strictly speaking, unintelligible (since it is supposed to be a right to determine what is right not by universally valid external laws limiting the freedom of each but by unilateral maxims through force); one would have to mean by it that it is quite right if human beings so disposed destroy one another and thus find perpetual peace in the vast grave that covers all the horrors of violence along with their authors. In accordance with reason there is only one way that states in relation with one another can leave the lawless condition, which involves nothing but war; it is that, like individual human beings, they give up their savage (lawless) freedom, accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and so form an (always growing) *state of nations* (*civitas gentium*) that would finally encompass all the nations of the earth. But, in accordance with their idea of the right of nations, they do not at all want this, thus rejecting *in hypothesi* what is correct *in thesi*; so (if all is not to be lost) in place of the positive idea of a *world republic* only the *negative* surrogate of a *league* that averts war, endures, and always expands can hold back the stream of hostile inclination that shies away from right, though with constant danger of its breaking out.* (*Furor impius intus – fremit horridus ore cruento*. Virgil.)^k

THIRD DEFINITIVE ARTICLE FOR
PERPETUAL PEACE

"Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal *hospitality*."

Here, as in the preceding articles, it is not a question of philanthropy but of *right*, so that *hospitality* (hospitalableness) means the right of a foreigner

* At the end of a war, when peace is concluded, it would not be unfitting for a nation to proclaim, after the festival of thanksgiving, a day of atonement, calling upon heaven, in the name of the state, to forgive the great sin of which the human race continues to be guilty, that of being unwilling to acquiesce in any lawful constitution in relation to other nations but, proud of its independence, preferring instead to use the barbarous means of war (even though what is sought by war, namely the right of each state, is not decided by it). Festivals of thanksgiving during a war for a *victory* won, hymns that (in the style of the Israelites) are sung to the *Lord of Hosts*, stand in no less marked contrast with the moral idea of the father of human beings; for, beyond indifference to the way nations seek their mutual rights (which is regrettable enough), they bring in joy at having annihilated a great many human beings or their happiness.

^j *erkenne*

^k Within, impious rage – shall roar savagely with bloody mouth. *Aeneid* 1.294–6.

not to be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the land of another. The other can turn him away, if this can be done without destroying him, but as long as he behaves peaceably where he is,¹ he cannot be treated with hostility. What he can claim is not the *right to be a guest* (for this a special beneficent pact would be required, making him a member of the household for a certain time), but the *right to visit*; this right, to present oneself for society, belongs to all human beings by virtue of the right of possession in common of the earth's surface on which, as a sphere, they cannot disperse infinitely but must finally put up with being near one another; but originally no one had more right than another to be on a place on the earth. Uninhabitable parts of the earth's surface, seas and deserts, divide this community, but in such a way that *ships* and *camels* (*ships* of the desert) make it possible to approach one another over these regions belonging to no one^m and to make use of the right to the *earth's surface*, which belongs to the human race in common, for possible commerce. The inhospitableness of the inhabitants of sea coasts (for example, the Barbary Coast) in robbing ships in adjacent seas or enslaving stranded seafarers, or that of the inhabitants of deserts (the Arabian Bedouins) in regarding approach to nomadic tribes as a right to plunder them, is therefore contrary to natural right; but this right to hospitality – that is, the authorization of a foreign newcomer – does not extend beyond the conditions which make it possible to *seek* commerce with the old inhabitants. In this way distant parts of the world can enter peaceably into relations with one another, which can eventually become publicly lawful and so finally bring the human race ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution.

If one compares with this the *inhospitable* behavior of civilized, especially commercial, states in our part of the world, the injustice they show in *visiting* foreign lands and peoples (which with them is tantamount to *conquering* them) goes to horrifying lengths. When America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, and so forth were discovered, they were, to them, countries belonging to no one,ⁿ since they counted the inhabitants as nothing. In the East Indies (Hindustan), they brought in foreign soldiers under the pretext of merely proposing to set up trading posts, but with them oppression of the inhabitants, incitement of the various Indian states to widespread wars, famine, rebellions, treachery, and the whole litany of troubles that oppress the human race.

China* and Japan (*Nipon*), which had given such guests a try, have

* In order to write this great empire with the name by which it calls itself (namely *China*, not Sina or a name that sounds like it), one need only consult Georgii's *Alphabetum Tibetanum*, pp. 651–54, especially note b. According to the observation of Professor Fischer of Petersburg, it really has no determinate name by which it calls itself; but the most common one is ¹ *auf seinem Platz*

^m *herrenlos*

ⁿ *die keinem angehörten*

therefore wisely [placed restrictions on them], the former allowing them access but not entry,^o the latter even allowing access to only a single European people, the Dutch, but excluding them, like prisoners, from community with the natives. The worst of this (or, considered from the standpoint of a moral judge, the best) is that the commercial states^p do not even profit from this violence; that all these trading companies are on the verge of collapse; that the Sugar Islands, that place of the cruelest and most calculated slavery, yield no true profit but serve only a mediate and indeed not very laudable purpose, namely, training sailors for warships and so, in turn, carrying on wars in Europe, and this for powers that make much ado of their piety and, while they drink wrongfulness like water, want to be known as the elect in orthodoxy.

8:360 Since the (narrower or wider) community of the nations of the earth has now gone so far that a violation of right on *one* place of the earth is felt in *all*, the idea of a cosmopolitan right is no fantastic and exaggerated way of representing right; it is, instead, a supplement to the unwritten code of the right of a state and the right of nations necessary for the sake of any

8:360 still the word *Kin*, namely *gold* (which the Tibetans express by *Ser*), so that the emperor is called King of *Gold* (i.e., of the most magnificent country in the world); it may well be that the word sounds like *Chin* in the empire itself, though (because of the guttural letter) it is pronounced *Kin* by the Italian missionaries. From this it can then be seen that what the Romans called the Land of the *Sers* was China but that silk was brought from there to Europe via *Greater Tibet* (presumably through *Lesser Tibet* and Bukhara, crossing Persia and so forth). This led to numerous reflections on the antiquity of this astonishing state as compared with that of Hindustan, and on its connection with *Tibet* and through this with Japan, although the name *Sina* or *Tschina*, which neighboring countries are supposed to give it, leads nowhere. Perhaps the ancient community between Europe and Tibet, which has never been rightly acknowledged, can also be explained from what Hesychius has kept open for us about it, namely from the hierophant's cry (*Konx Ompax*) in the Eleusinian Mysteries (cf. *Journey of the Younger Anacharsis*, Part V, p. 447 ff.). For, according to Georgii's *Alphabetum Tibetanum*, the word *Concioa* means *god*, and it markedly resembles *Konx*, and *Pah-cio* (ibid. p. 520), which the Greeks might easily have pronounced *pax*, means *promulgator legis*, the divinity pervading the whole of nature (also called *Cencredi*, p. 177). But *Om*, which La Croze translates as *benedictus*, *blessed*, can scarcely mean anything other than *beatific*, if applied to the deity (p. 507). Now since P. Francisco Orazio, who repeatedly asked the Tibetan *lamas* what they understood by god (*Concioa*), always received the answer, "*It is the gathering of all the holy ones*" (i.e., of the blessed souls, at last returned to divinity by being reborn as lamas after numerous migrations through all kinds of bodies, transformed into *Burchane*, i.e., beings worthy of adoration, p. 223), that mysterious name *Konx Ompax* could well designate that *holy (Konx)*, *blessed (Om)*, and *wise (Pax)* supreme being who pervades the whole world (nature personified) and, used in the Greek *mysteries*, may well have signified *monotheism* to the epopts, as opposed to the *polytheism* of the uninitiated masses, although P. Orazio suspected a kind of atheism behind it (loc. cit.). But how that mysterious word reached the Greeks across Tibet can be explained in the above way, which can also make plausible the early commerce of Europe with China across Tibet (perhaps even earlier than with Hindustan).⁶

^o *den Zugang, aber nicht den Eingang*

^p *dieser*

TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE

public rights of human beings and so for perpetual peace; only under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are constantly approaching perpetual peace.

First supplement

On the guarantee of perpetual peace

What affords this *guarantee* (surety) is nothing less than the great artist nature (*natura daedala rerum*)⁴ from whose mechanical course purposiveness shines forth visibly, letting concord arise by means of the discord between human beings even against their will; and for this reason nature, regarded as necessitation by a cause the laws of whose operation are unknown to us, is called *fate*, but if we consider its purposiveness in the course of the world as the profound wisdom of a higher cause directed to the objective final end of the human race and predetermining this course of the world, it is called *providence*,* which

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* In the mechanism of nature, to which the human being (as a sensible being) belongs, there is evident a form lying at the basis of its existence, which we can make comprehensible to ourselves only if we ascribe it to the end of a creator of the world determining it in advance; we call its determination in advance (divine) *providence* in general; insofar as it is put in the *beginning* of the world, we call it *founding* providence (*providentia conditrix; semel iussit, semper parent* – Augustine);⁷ but as put in the *course* of nature, to maintain this in accord with universal laws of purposiveness, we call it *ruling* providence (*providentia gubernatrix*); as [directing nature] further to particular ends not to be foreseen by the human being but only conjectured from the outcome, we call it *guiding* providence (*providentia directrix*); and finally, with respect to single events as divine ends, we no longer call it providence but *dispensation* (*directio extraordinaria*), although (since this in fact alludes to miracles, though the events are not called such), it is a foolish presumption for the human being to want to cognize an event as a dispensation; for it is absurd to conclude from a single event to a particular principle of the efficient cause (to conclude that this event is an end and not merely an indirect result, by a natural mechanism, of another end quite unknown to us), and it is full of self-conceit, however pious and humble such talk may sound. So too the division of providence (regarded *materialiter*), as directed to *objects* in the world, into *general* and *special* providence is false and self-contradictory (that, e.g., it is indeed concerned to preserve species of creatures but leaves individuals to chance); for it is called general in its purpose just because no single thing is thought to be excepted from it. Presumably, what was meant here is the division of providence (regarded *formaliter*) in terms of the way its purpose is carried out, namely into *ordinary* providence (e.g., the annual death and revival of nature with the changes of seasons) and *extraordinary* providence (e.g., the transporting of wood by ocean currents to Arctic coasts where it cannot grow, thus providing for the native inhabitants, who could not live without it); in the latter case, although we can very well explain to ourselves the physico-mechanical cause of these appearances (e.g., by the wooded river banks in temperate countries, where trees fall into the rivers and are carried farther afield by currents such as the Gulf Stream), we must still not overlook the teleological cause as well, which intimates the foresight of a wisdom in command of nature. But as for the concept, current in the schools, of a divine *intervention* or collaboration

⁴ Nature the contriver of things. Lucretius *De rerum natura* 5.234.

⁷ Providence the founder; once it has ordered, they always obey.