

Contract and Domination

Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills

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1

Contract and Social Change

A Dialogue between Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills

Carole Pateman Most people who know that the authors of this book are a white woman and a black man, both professors, will probably make an (implicit) assumption about our respective backgrounds. The white woman will be assumed to come from a better-off, or at least better educated, stratum of society than the black man. White women have made more inroads into academia in the past quarter-century than black men and professors tend to come from middle-class and professional households, so the assumption is not altogether unreasonable. In this case it is misplaced, but it serves to illustrate the complexities of race and sex. Carole Pateman's parents had only the education that could be acquired by the age of 14, and she left school herself at 16, entering into university later via Ruskin College, an adult education college in England. Charles Mills's father had degrees from the London School of Economics and Harvard, became a professor in Jamaica at the University of the West Indies, headed his department, and became Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences. On the other hand, when either of them is going about their daily business in the United States, where both now live, they will be perceived and often treated differently. A middle-aged white woman, for example, runs no danger of facing a penalty for driving while black.

Charles Mills The complexities of race, class, and sex, yes. It's so difficult to think them all together – like the many-body problem in mechanics – because they're all interacting with one another. My own case is interesting (to move to the personal level), since it's not just class, gender, and race, but nationality and ethnicity also, and how they affect the translation of these three across different national boundaries. In

Jamaica, as you rightly say, I was class-privileged by comparison to you in England: from the Jamaican middle class, my father a university professor, and going to what was then an elite high school, Jamaica College. I was also privileged by gender, obviously, and also to a certain extent by color. When I give talks on American college campuses, one of the things I always make a point of telling undergraduate audiences – usually to the bewilderment of students with little sense of the contingency and relativity of race – is that I'm only black in the US. In Jamaica, with a different set of racial/color rules, I count as "brown" rather than "black," since blackness isn't determined by the "one-drop rule" (any black ancestry makes you black) as it is here. So browns constitute a recognized and relatively privileged social category of their own, intermediate between white and black, who especially after Jamaica's independence in 1962 become prominent in social and political spheres, though whites still have a lot of economic power.

And this has implications in terms of how you think about yourself, and how you see race. In Jamaica, as a middle-class brown kid, I wasn't very racially conscious, and would have thought of black Americans as puzzlingly obsessed with race.

CP Becoming better acquainted with some of the literature both past and in the present on "the race question" has reinforced for me just how bizarre and arbitrary the racial classifications are – and just as the "woman question" should more accurately be termed "the man question," so this is, in the countries I have been writing about, "the white question." It is a deeply puzzling question exactly why skin color is so fervently held to signify various attributes, to be a mark of worth and a reason for hatred and homicide. Why should "one drop" outweigh all the other drops? Why is not the whole edifice seen to be ridiculous when, for example, in apartheid South Africa the Japanese were declared honorary whites? That, of course, is a rhetorical question; if I have learnt one thing from my interest in the history of feminism it is that rational argument does not go very far.

CM On one level, racial classifications certainly are "bizarre and arbitrary," as you say. (One manifestation of this was that there was scholarly variation even on an issue as presumably basic as the number of races.) On another level, of course, left theorists in sociology would claim it's not arbitrary at all, but that the logic is sociopolitical, external, rather than intrinsic to the subject matter. Race is constructed according to particular political projects, and the lines of demarcation are drawn accordingly. So the one-drop rule, for example – which only applies to blacks, not other "races" (by its nature, it can't be generalized,

for consistency reasons) – arose out of the need in the US to make sure that children of whites and blacks (and subsequent mixtures down the line) had the status of the “lower” race. Given the amount of white male/black female “miscegenation” that was taking place (outright rape and other kinds of coerced sexual relationships), it was important not to permit the growth of a class of “mixed” people with the same status as whites. So it’s “rational” in the sense of being tied to the interests of privileged groups, and the reproduction of that privilege – instrumental political rationality if not scientific rationality.

CP Of course, as you say, if the classifications are viewed from the perspective of those in power (who are determined to hang on to their power) then, say, for Japanese to be honorary whites can seem quite “rational.” As I note in chapter 5, legislation was used in seventeenth-century Virginia to override the common law practice of patrilineal descent so that children of slave women inherited their mother’s lifetime bondage and were “black” irrespective of their paternity. But all these stratagems, and the amount of effort required to implement them, sit very uneasily with the insistence that the subordinated naturally lack the capacities to govern themselves, hence the irrationality of it all is never very far from the surface. A good deal of denial and refusal to look and see what is going on is involved in maintaining both racial classifications and the subordination of women. Today, there is still much turning away but, after the successes of political movements over the past few decades, it is harder than it once was.

CM Yes, it is harder, but unfortunately still possible. So progressive political theorists have to try to understand a complicated set of interrelations of domination. In the process you make generalizations which have to be heavily qualified, and even then you often don’t get it right. (Thereby vindicating postmodernists, or at least so they would claim.) In the old days, it was straightforward – to be “radical” meant being some variety of leftist, with Marxism as the most prestigious body of radical theory. And gender and race – the “woman question,” the “Negro question,” the “native question” – were an afterthought, if they were thought of at all. Now of course Marxism is dead, so nobody talks about class at all, despite the fact that here in the US the gap between rich and poor is now wider than it has been since the age of the Roaring Twenties. Second-wave feminism, both inside and outside the academy, was for a long time basically white feminism, with women of color being marginalized, and in the black, brown, and red antiracist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, gender usually took a back seat. So in a perverse sense, the Marxist model was emulated by other radical movements,

with class/gender/race respectively being everything, or almost everything, and the others being sidelined. I know that that's another misleading generalization, of course, since socialist feminists were trying to combine the theorization of capitalism and patriarchy. But given the marginality of left theory in this country, they were always peripheral to mainstream feminism.

CP Generalizations, even carefully qualified, have not been popular for some time in feminist theory (in the case of men and women, for example, you are accused of setting up "binaries" or believing that men and women are "naturally" antagonistic and so on). But without generalization structures of power tend to disappear into a sea of differences with few criteria to hand to decide which are the more important.

CM Yes, "difference" rules – with commonality banished! But as someone who started out on the Marxist left, and retains many of those ideological sympathies, I completely agree that we need to be able to generalize and to develop abstractions, even if they're only approximately true. The challenge is how to do this, given the complexity of social reality.

CP In *The Sexual Contract* I spent a good deal of effort trying to analyze the connections between the employment contract and the marriage contract. Employment and marriage are two of the central institutions of modern societies, and are also central to sex and class – and race. The "working class," and especially the aristocracy of labor, was the white male working class. The worker's wife, and the interrelationship between marriage and employment, were erased from the picture, as was the fact that the labor market was segmented according to race as well as sex. So there is a sense in which class was very much part of my book, but critics have paid little attention to my critique of employment. I am usually seen as writing about women – but to do that, or to write about race, is also to write about class since women and nonwhites are mostly found at the lower rungs of the occupational ladder, in casual and part-time jobs and in the ranks of the poor. But that raises a very important question: what does and can "class" mean in the first decade of the twenty-first century?

CM In the US, nothing, since everybody is supposed to be middle-class, and pointing out the huge and growing wealth differentials is declaring class war (as against creating the differentials, which is class peace). At the same time the percentage of the work force that's unionized is down

to 12 percent or so, the lowest in decades, with a crisis in the trade union movement, and rollbacks in pensions, health care benefits, and so forth. Certainly the material for left-wing analysis is there. But the problem is mapping a positive alternative, in a world where the left has been so thoroughly defeated and seemingly discredited.

CP A knotty problem indeed, not least because the grand utopian designs of the past do not have a good track record. However, we do still need to have as clear a sense as possible of the direction in which we want to move and some ideas about the institutional and other changes required. As far as political philosophy is concerned, some of the fashionable developments seem to me to be in tune with political and economic developments rather than offering a way to an alternative. Contract theory is a good example. Commodification is proceeding at an extraordinarily rapid rate; there is virtually nothing left now that is outside the reach of private property, contract, and alienation. This is one reason why I am much less happy than you with trying to salvage contract theory.

CM Yes, I know – this is something we need to talk about. In my work I'm operating with a significantly weaker and less loaded version of contract theory, pretty minimalist in its assumptions. It's certainly not tied to property in the person, as the specific Lockean contract is. Rather, it's a conception developed for utilization in a philosophical framework aimed at adjudicating matters of social justice, drawing normatively on central liberal-democratic ideals and factually on the simple insight that humans create the sociopolitical, and in the process themselves. In this weak sense, is "contract" really something you would object to? Surely not.

CP We have some important differences about contract theory. Neither of us, as you put it so nicely in your book, is working with ideal contract theory. But I am more critical than you of the whole enterprise. At the very broad level that you raise now, it is not so much your assumptions that I take issue with – my own work rests on the insight that humans create their own social and political structures and institutions; they are not "natural" – but the notion of "contract" itself. The question I am asking is why, say, social justice has to be discussed or adjudicated using the metaphor of contract.

The most common response is to argue that just or equitable democratic outcomes are most likely, or only likely, if the process through which they are arrived at is one of voluntary agreement, and "contract" captures what is required for such a process. My objection to that line

of argument is that there is more than one form of free agreement and that these are not exhausted by contract. This is a point I made a long time ago in *The Problem of Political Obligation* (originally published in 1979). Although you use a minimalist version of contract theory, “contract” has to have some content. At a very general level that need not involve property in the person but, even without that, there is other baggage. On the one hand, in theories of original contracts – as Rousseau was well aware – the point of the social contract is that in the modern state individuals give up their right of self-government to another or a few others. And, as you and I are arguing, the original contract involves the sexual and racial contracts too.

On the other hand, if you start with a model of two individuals, the model requires that both are self-interested and only act if there is sufficient benefit to each of them taken separately. Now, you might reply that there can be an agreement without going along either of those paths. In that case, I go back to my question. Why introduce “contract” at all? Why not start by trying to move to another model of free agreement? It is very hard to get rid of the baggage, and most political theorists do not attempt to. Why not find other terms for “free agreement talk” that also convey the meaning of a voluntary mutual undertaking and offer some hope at least of moving away from all the associations and assumptions of “contract”? Contract has a valuable commercial place, but my argument is that it should be kept in that place. To see the whole of social and political life as no more than a series of contracts, to see individuals as packages of alienable property and to insist that “contract” is the metaphor for a free society is a very narrow view of humans and what they create. In short, my objection is that freedom has become identified with contract and I want to drive a wedge between the two. Freedom has other forms. Can “contract” be washed clean of the history of justification of subjection?

CM A standard distinction drawn in at least some philosophical discussions is that between “contractarianism” and “contractualism.” (Stephen Darwall, for example, has edited a book with just that title: *Contractarianism/Contractualism* (2003).) The former (paradigmatically Hobbes, and theorists inspired by him such as David Gauthier) see morality as conventionalist, as constrained and socially coordinated self-interest, so that the “contract” does really capture the idea of people bargaining with one another. But for the latter, morality is an objective set of other-regarding rules, and the “contract” is really (in Rawls’s phrase) a “device of representation” for getting at what those rules are. So the contract is in fact quite dispensable, as various critics of Rawls pointed out fairly early on. (Similarly, Kant’s hypothetical

contractualism turns the contract into an “idea of reason,” and as such a way of representing what is the really important underlying principle of ethics, viz. the categorical imperative.) You don’t need Rawls’s apparatus to get, say, the principle of equal liberties, or the difference principle – you can get them by arguing from basic considerations of how we should treat other people.

So for philosophers, the picture you paint above (self-interested individuals looking out for their own benefit) would really only apply to “contractarianism” (in this technical, term-of-art sense) not “contractualism.” And relatedly, these philosophers would claim that the negative features you associate with contract (a commercial model of a “free” society as calculated self-seeking exchanges between individuals of the *homo economicus* species), while true of the Hobbesian-inspired versions, are not true of the Kantian-inspired versions.

Of course, one can then legitimately ask (as you do) why even use the language of “contract” at all, if this alternative conception is so remote from the original sense of the term? And why bother to go through all the elaborate stages of setting up the veil of ignorance, etc., if one can get the outcome far more straightforwardly and directly? The argument has been that it serves a useful heuristic purpose – it’s a way of dramatizing the original social contract idea of humans choosing the principles that would regulate a just society. So it’s a “contract” in that attenuated sense, and so (arguably anyway) still linked with the tradition.

I think a significant part of our disagreement on “contract” arises from divergent disciplinary perspectives (political science vs philosophy). As such, I’m not sure how much of our seeming disagreement is substantive and how much is merely terminological and in large part really just hinges on semantics – how we’re using the term “contract,” and what background disciplinary assumptions underlie this use.

CP The fact that your career has been in philosophy and mine in political science no doubt has some bearing on how we approach contract theory, but there is more to it than that. First, perhaps I should say that I resisted becoming a philosopher (a path I was urged to follow) because I realized that my interests did not lie in purely philosophical problems. That said, I benefited enormously both from my undergraduate study of philosophy in the heyday of “Oxford philosophy” and from working as a graduate student with Brian Barry, one of the most eminent political philosophers working in the analytical tradition. I have always been keen on bringing together empirical evidence and theoretical argument, and more recently have used historical and legal scholarship. The label “political theorist” allows me to do that and to draw on analytical methods.

CM Actually, though I did go into philosophy, and ended up as a philosopher, I had misgivings from the start, in part precisely because of concern about its remoteness from real-world issues. So I've always read extensively outside of philosophy texts, and this is manifested not just in my dissertation but in all three of my books, which are full of empirical stuff: history, sociology, political science, etc. (For purists, of course, this renders them suspect *as* philosophy.) But my belief has always been that if philosophy is to live up to its pretensions to illuminate the world, factually and normatively, it needs to know something *about* the world – not, one would think, an inherently absurd thesis.

CP We do not disagree about that! Still, our differences are more than terminological. I take issue with both “contractarianism” and “contractualism.” In *The Sexual Contract* I used “contractarianism” to refer to a specific tradition of argument, which, as you note, goes back to Hobbes. In the United States it is usually called libertarianism, but I rebranded it (as the saying now goes) in order to bring out the connection with contract theory and in order to explore the logic of the form of argument which (I argued) was crucial for an understanding of what was at stake in theories of original contracts and their successors. Contract is seen as the practice which exemplifies freedom, but to appreciate why and how that claim can be made it is necessary to grasp the vital place of the idea of property in the person. That becomes clear through an analysis of the logic of contractarianism.

The political fiction of property in the person is required in order to present major institutions such as traditional marriage and employment as constituted by free relations. Pieces of property in the person can (be said to) be freely contracted out without detriment to the person who owns them. Thus a worker who voluntarily enters an employment contract rents out not himself but his services or labor power, a piece of the property he owns in his person. However, the problem is that property in the person is a fiction. Property in the person cannot be contracted out in the absence of the owner. If the worker's services (property) are to be “employed” in the manner required by the employer, the worker has to go with them. The property is useful to the employer only if the worker acts as the employer demands and, therefore, entry into the contract means that the worker becomes a subordinate. The consequence of voluntary entry into a contract is not freedom but superiority and subordination.

The assumption is that no one enters a contract unless it is to their benefit; they can always refuse a particular contract. Implicitly, another assumption is also being made. This comes to the surface once the consequences and not just the fact of entry into a contract about property

in the person are considered. Or, to put this another way, it becomes explicit when contracts about property in the person are put in the context of the institutions which they help constitute and are not seen as an endless series of acts between two parties. The individual is said to be contracting out use of labor power or a service, but what is also being assumed is that it is to the advantage of individuals to give up another piece of the property in their person, namely the "property" they have in their right of self-government or autonomy, a "property" which is necessary for them to participate in the practice of contract. The social contract depends on this assumption, as I argued in my book on political obligation, and so do the institutions of (traditional) marriage and employment.

Contractarians, or, at least, those who have the courage of their convictions, treat social life as nothing but contract all the way down, but contractarianism is rarely taken to its logical conclusion. The conclusion is that there are no limits on the property in the person that can be contracted out (no one would do it if it were not to their advantage), so that (uncoerced) slavery and "renting" of votes, for instance, become legitimate. David Ellerman, an economist, is one of the few scholars to have analyzed the logic of contractarianism and pointed this out. I drew on one such essay, which he wrote under the nom de plume of Philmore, in *The Sexual Contract*. (He revealed in 1995 that he was the author.)

CM I had noticed that in *The Sexual Contract* you made that connection between Hobbesian contract theory and libertarianism, and I had wondered about it at the time. "Libertarianism" is used in different senses, of course, but in philosophy (I don't know about political science) the most important text would probably still be Robert Nozick's 1974 *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. But the key theorist for Nozick isn't Hobbes, but Locke. It's Locke who claims that we have property rights, including the right of self-ownership, even in the state of nature.

For Hobbes, as you know, the state of nature is amoral, and though we have possessions, we don't have property rights there. The only right we have is the "right of nature," basically an unconstrained liberty to do whatever we deem necessary to survive. And this is quite different from Locke, where the state of nature is moralized, and our freedoms are limited by natural law, which requires respecting the rights of others. Moreover, the Lockean polity is supposed to be constrained in its architecture by natural law also, in that human civil laws cannot contravene natural law. The Lockean contract is not morally conventionalist in any deep sense, then, since there is an objective standard for what constitutes a good polity, including constitutional rights and freedoms, licit

boundaries of state action, etc. So Nozick's libertarianism is neo-Lockean, demanding that we respect the rights people objectively have, including their property rights, which for him meant getting rid of the welfare state.

To the extent that self-ownership is crucial to your argument, then, I wonder if Hobbes can really be your presiding contract theorist spirit, since for him property rights are not basic but determined arbitrarily by the absolutist sovereign. (The Lockean sovereign, by contrast, has to respect pre-existing property rights.) So if he decided it worked better, he could decree socialist property rights tomorrow. So if self-ownership, private property rights, and property in the person are foundational to libertarianism, isn't that Locke rather than Hobbes? And if it is, then social life can't be "contract all the way down," since natural law provides a set of objective moral guidelines which cannot be transgressed. (Locke says explicitly in the *Second Treatise*, for example, that you *may not* sell yourself into slavery.) It seems to me, then, that you're working with a hybrid concept that's drawing on two different and conflicting strains of contract theory: property in the person as foundational, which is Lockean, and morally unconstrained freedom to make all kinds of property transactions, which is more Hobbesian. That's why I'm unsure that property in the person necessarily has all the pernicious consequences you're attributing to it.

But in any case, as I said, I am working (on the moral side) in the contractualist rather than the contractarian tradition, and so in the Kantian rather than Hobbesian strain. Kant is no socialist (though attempts have been made to argue for socialism from Kantian principles), but property in the person isn't really crucial to his theory. Rather personhood is, and our duty not to treat others as mere means. Correspondingly, the variety of contract theory advocated by Rawls and Thomas Scanlon is centered on what principles we should choose to regulate society given this overriding commitment to respecting others' personhood. I don't see why this kind of contract isn't perfectly defensible in principle as a set of moral guidelines, so I'm still trying to get clear on why you object to it.

I guess part of the reason is the link you're making between property in the person as self-ownership and "property as people's right of self-government or autonomy." So that would undercut the distinction I'm trying to draw between Lockean and Kantian contract theory (though I would still claim that insofar as objective moral principles are presupposed in both versions, they're both clearly distinct from Hobbesian theory). I did read your book in grad school, but that was, alas, a long time ago and I can no longer recall your argument. Refresh my memory: is the claim a factual one, that because of the way the

world is, autonomy (self-government) requires property in the person, or is it a conceptual one?

CP I have developed my argument about autonomy much more recently, so you would not have read it in grad school. I am arguing that autonomy requires that the political fiction of property in the person is relinquished (Pateman 2002). But to understand how relations of subordination can be presented as free relations the conception of the individual as owner of property in the person is crucial. Individuals can then be seen as renting out a piece of property (a service), not their person. My claim is that we need to grasp the idea to understand the present but it has to be discarded to create a more democratic future.

One problem that I have with Kantian/Rawlsian “contractualism” is precisely that contract theory is now taken to be about morality and moral principles. Political philosophy has been turned into moral philosophy. But the examples I have just provided are not about morality (which is not to say that moral considerations are irrelevant), they are about social and political institutions and the political right of individual self-government. Moreover, theories of original contracts are not about moral reasoning either. To be sure, they are conventionalist, but they are about the creation and justification of specific forms of political order; they are about the creation of the modern state and structures of power, including sexual and racial power. To see Kant as an unqualified universalist and champion of individual autonomy is to ignore his writings about sexual and racial difference, part of his argument about politics not morals. He endorsed not just the social contract but also the sexual and racial contracts. Similarly, as Susan Okin demonstrated in detail, Rawls presupposed men’s privileges within the family.

So I do not agree that “contract” is useful because it is a way of dramatizing that humans choose principles, just as they do in the classic theories of an original contract. In the latter theories, the parties to the original contract (are said to) choose – justifiably choose – the modern state and institutions of subordination. Contract, in particular contracts about property in the person, is the major mechanism through which these unfree institutions are perpetuated and presented as free institutions. Contemporary contract theory provides no help in either of its guises if we wish to create a more democratic and a more free society; we need an alternative political theory.

CM Re the “political philosophy as moral philosophy” and “political philosophy as the study of institutional power” distinction: of course, as we both agree, actual “social contracts” have not remotely conformed to any moral ideal. Political theory in the classic tradition dealt

both with factual and normative issues, but you're right that mainstream Anglo-American political philosophy (which equals political philosophy simpliciter for mainstream Anglo-American types) now focuses, at least since Rawls revived it, just on normative matters. Particularly for the left tradition, though, the way things actually work is crucial. The late Jean Hampton, whom I've cited repeatedly in my work, was a feminist contract theorist who was critical of contemporary political philosophy's one-dimensionality. Hampton argued that the classic contract had both descriptive and normative aspirations. ("Descriptive" on a figural rather than literal level, of course.) I've picked up on and developed this theme by actually formally separating the descriptive and the normative aspects of the contract, as I discuss in my chapters in this book.

Rawls's contract is a normative contract, and one of a specific kind: a contract for an ideally just state. Your sexual contract and my racial contract are descriptive contracts of (manifestly) non-ideal states. So we're both using contract in a non-normative way to model oppressive societies. But I want to retain the normative side of contract theory by insisting that one can still then ask: in the light of these clearly *unjust* contracts (of sex and race), what does justice now "contractually" demand of us? So this is the normative contract rather than the descriptive contract. But by contrast with Rawls, this wouldn't be ideal moral theory, but non-ideal moral theory. An ideally just state is unattainable since that would be a state with no past history of injustice. So what we're trying to adjudicate is what corrective justice (by definition "non-ideal") now requires to eliminate or at least reduce past injustice. And my claim, as in my reparations chapter (chapter 4), is that a modified Rawlsianism can be adapted to that end.

I agree with you, of course, that Kant's vaunted universalism is actually limited to the white male population (or an even smaller subgroup thereof); indeed, I have published on this subject myself. (See my "Kant's *Untermenschen*" (Mills 2005b).) So when I said "Kantian contractualism," I was taking for granted that we are dealing with a sanitized Kantianism, washed clean of the sexism and racism. (If you see Kant as too deeply stained to grant him this titular status, then OK, choose some other term – deontology, or personhood theory. But that's a terminological rather than substantive point, since obviously the principle of respect for persons can be extended in a gender- and race-neutral way, whatever we choose to call it.)

Similarly, you cite Okin's justified critique in her book *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (1989) of Rawls's ignoring of gender privilege. But nonetheless Okin still went on in that book to argue that a Rawlsian apparatus can be used to go beyond Rawls himself; we can ask what

gender justice in the family would require if one took into account the real-life family and the disadvantaging of girls and women in it. So Okin was in principle supportive of the “original position” conceptual framework, while critical of Rawls’s own circumscribed use of it. And this is the model I’m following to theorize the correction of racial injustice. What would you choose behind the veil on prudential grounds (worried that you might turn out to be, say, black) if you knew your options were limited to non-ideal societies shaped by the legacy of white supremacy, and regulated respectively by corrective public policy measures ranging from non-existent to very strong? So what I’m not clear on is why you think Okin’s adaptation of Rawls, and my attempt to emulate her on race, can’t give us useful moral insights about what gender and racial justice demand to correct for the real-life sexual and racial contracts.

CP Let me begin with your last point. Of course, I am not suggesting anything so absurd as that you or Susan Okin have no insights to offer. My question is how far those insights derive from the use of a (modified) Rawlsian approach. *Justice, Gender, and the Family*, for instance, contains an internal critique of Rawls et al. and an analysis of traditional marriage that uses empirical data. It seems to me that Okin’s argument can be made without thinking about what we would choose if we had certain characteristics behind the veil of ignorance. I can see that such a thought experiment is an interesting philosophical exercise. But we are not behind the veil, we are right here, in circumstances that we have somehow to deal with. Thus the pertinent question for me is what policies might be feasible and have a reasonable chance of moving things in a more democratic direction. And that also requires an analysis of what is wrong at present, an analysis that we undertook in our two books. I prefer a more direct approach rather than asking what principles we might choose if we were in a hypothetical original position. Contractualism is not the only way of offering justifications for political starting points and policies.

Incidentally, in my chapter responding to my critics I quote Jean Hampton. She lets the cat out of the bag by admitting that in Rawlsian moral reasoning the contract metaphor does no real work. Reference to contract, she states, is not “in any sense foundational, or even necessary” (Hampton 2001: 357). Moral reasoning, that is, can be conducted without it – and, I would add, so can political analysis, criticism, and recommendations.

If I have understood it properly, I also balk at the normative/descriptive division. It seems to me reminiscent of old claims about the separation of facts and values which I criticized in my (unpublished) D. Phil.

thesis. You and I may both be writing about non-ideal contracts, but I would resist the notion that either *The Sexual Contract* or *The Racial Contract* is non-normative. The latter embodies a number of values and is politically normative; that is its point. And my criticisms of the sexual contract in my book have a number of normative implications about a more free and just society.

CM No, contract theory is not necessary to make a moral case for gender and racial justice, political democratization, and so forth. I'm not at all actually in disagreement with you on this score. Hampton's "letting the cat out of the bag," as you put it, is actually a familiar concession often made by contract theorists, at least the contemporary ones. Among the earliest criticisms of Rawls was that there were non-contractual routes to his moral conclusions, and he never denied this. So the claim has never been the strong claim that contract theory is the only way to go, but the weaker claim that it's the best – or, weaker still, one of the best – way(s) to go. And you're certainly correct that there are far more direct ways to go – for example through appealing directly to some schedule of rights, to ideals of self-realization, to human moral equality, and so forth.

From my own perspective, however, the overwhelming rationale for seeking to engage with contract theory is that it's already there, and hegemonic. In other words, it's not as if political philosophers today are starting from scratch, considering a range of alternatives, and then asking, how should we theorize about justice? Rather this approach has been established for decades as the most influential one. So if you're working on a marginal topic (race), as I am, then translating racial justice issues into a contract framework seems a natural route for mainstreaming topics not normally discussed in the literature. You're then challenging white contract theorists: if the actual "contract" that has established the present social order is so radically different from the sanitized version presupposed in your discourse, then shouldn't we be talking about the implications of that fact for justice? That doesn't mean they're going to listen, of course – certainly it's not remotely been the case that *The Racial Contract* has led to any rethinking of how contract theory is done in these circles! – but in theory at least you're raising a question which they should feel philosophically obligated to answer. As you know, the article on contract theory by Ann Cudd in the Stanford online encyclopedia of philosophy has us both listed there under the subsection of "subversive contractarianism" ("contractarianism" in the all-inclusive sense). The difference between us, then, is that I want to see subversive contract theory become mainstream contract theory, whereas you've written off contract theory altogether.

The fact/value descriptive/normative distinction can be formulated in different ways, and on different dimensions, some obviously vulnerable to criticisms, others less so. My usage of the contrast in this context, and in my other chapters, was not supposed to involve any particularly deep philosophical claim. It was just the obvious point (with which I think you would agree) that Rawls is employing the contract to map out a normatively ideal society, which does not exist, while you and I are using the contract to map out actual societies, which do exist. So in that respect we are both using the contract “descriptively” in a way that Rawls is not. At the same time, of course – and this was the point of our respective books – we are making implicit and explicit normative judgments about the sexism and racism of these societies. So in that sense (if that was your point) our characterizations are both descriptive and normative, factual and evaluative. But neither of us offered a detailed mapping of what gender or racial justice would require in the way of social transformation. So that’s what I meant by saying we didn’t use the contract normatively – we didn’t explore within a contract framework what an ideally just gender and racial order would look like.

CP Let me take up your earlier points about Hobbes, Locke, and contractarianism. My argument is that to understand the full logic of contract theory it is necessary to go back to Hobbes. My discussion of Hobbes drew on my analysis of his political theory in *The Problem of Political Obligation*. That book is also about theories of an original contract, but it is a criticism of the social contract in its standard interpretation.

Hobbes’s state of nature is a mere collection of individuals with no natural connections (initially, entities in perpetual motion which are recomposed into individuals). Therefore, all relationships have to be created by these individuals and are thus all conventional, including family relations. Hobbes is a complete conventionalist. Contractarians also see individuals abstractly, in isolation from each other, and so they too must create all their own ties through contract (all the way down). You remark that in Hobbes’s theory rights are not basic but depend on the will of the sovereign, so I should look rather to Locke than to Hobbes. But the logic is blurred in Locke; his state of nature is social, he sees individuals as part of God’s workmanship and so on. Hobbes’s radical individualism is crucial for understanding contractarianism.

In the state of nature Hobbes’s individuals have the right to all things, and assess their position from a purely private (subjective) perspective. It is a very stark – and anthropologically unrealistic – conception, but is nonetheless a version of individual self-government. (Some severe coordination problems arise with this view of social life and I discussed

the problems about covenants and Hobbes in my earlier book. I do not think that it is accidental that the most radical individualism is accompanied by Leviathan.) A contract, Hobbes tells us, is the mutual transfer of rights, a transfer that both parties judge is to their advantage. Thus I would argue that rights are also basic in Hobbes. In theories of original contracts, save for that of Rousseau, what happens in the social contract is that self-government is divided into two parts, private and political, and individuals give up their right of political self-government to representatives who decide for them. For Hobbes, political alienation is absolute, although even Leviathan has no sway over the right of self-preservation.

Of course, it is Locke, not Hobbes, who explicitly writes of property in the person, and my discussions of property in the person and self-ownership draw on Locke not Hobbes. And I should perhaps say explicitly that I introduced property in the person only in *The Sexual Contract*; it is not part of my earlier argument about political obligation. Nevertheless, consider Hobbes's individuals in the state of nature. They stand in the world with no ties to others except those they voluntarily forge through contract (and Hobbes treats coerced contracts as voluntary). Another way of looking at this portrayal is that such individuals, necessarily, own themselves. They are self-governing or autonomous in that sense. Hobbes's individuals own their rights, which can thus be seen as property along with their other attributes. Only the individual can judge when to contract out, or refrain from contracting out, some of that property owned in the person. In Hobbes's state of nature individuals decide that their political property (rights) should be relinquished to Leviathan. In civil society they still retain their right to make judgments about their private affairs. In principle, as you note, Leviathan could sweep away the latter right but Hobbes does not go that far.

As your reference to Nozick indicates, contractarians (i.e. libertarians) do not envisage Leviathan but a minimal state. However, they have a problem with institutions since they focus on contracts between individuals, abstractly conceived. Institutions fade away and this makes it easy to gloss over the subordination consequent upon entering into contracts about property in the person. I will not repeat my argument about that but I hope that I have said enough to show why I see Hobbes, and contractarianism, as central if the logic is to be appreciated.

Most contemporary contract theorists are far from being contractarians; they are contractualists. In other words, the logic of contract is dulled and sanitized in the Rawlsian approach so that, for example, the institution of employment can be put aside and taken for granted in an argument that claims that our social life is a voluntary cooperative

scheme. If we only think about what we would choose behind the veil we can see that this is an acceptable description. Locke is important in this process of obfuscation, as is Kant. I do not think that Kant can be scrubbed clean and, in any case, in his bloodless version of the original contract the alienation of the right of political self-government (the institution of the modern state) becomes a necessary proposition in the creation of civilization. So I am back where I began; I do not agree we need contractualism to make the kind of case that you and I want to make for democratization.

CM Your discussion of Hobbes and Locke really helps me to understand more clearly how you're viewing contract theory. For you, I now realize (I guess this was in your book), Hobbes is the paradigmatic contract theorist, and the others are only contract theorists in a Pickwickian sense, if that much. Contract theory for you is essentially predicated on the starting-point of individuals with no social or moral relations with one another, so that all their relationships are created, thus conventional, with contract extending "all the way down." Hence your judgment that Locke's alleged state of nature is really social, and that the logic of contract is blurred in Locke and Kant. So the contractarianism/contractualism distinction for you is in a sense bogus, insofar as both are wrongly being represented as falling under the genus of contract theory. Really, contractualism is a disingenuous attempt to avoid the unpalatable implications of contractarianism, which is actually coextensive with contract theory once its foundational assumptions are honestly faced. So that gives me a better sense of why you think the contract really can't be redeemed in any form.

I guess I'm not sure what response to make at this stage. You're offering what seems to me pretty clearly a revisionist view of the tradition (which doesn't make it wrong, of course), insofar as "contract theory" has traditionally been taken to include non-Hobbesian as well as Hobbesian approaches, with the former not viewed as bad-faith pretenders but legitimate alternatives. Histories of contract theory, such as those by J. W. Gough (1978) and Michael Lessnoff (1986), detail medieval antecedents whose assumptions about human interconnectedness are obviously antithetical to Hobbes's. But of course you could reply that by their very premodern character they can't serve as instantiations of contractarianism in the radically individualist sense that defines this new way of thinking about the sociopolitical. But even if you take individuals in the state of nature as your starting-point, why should the assumption that they have no moral relations with one another be assumed to demarcate the legitimate conceptual boundaries of the tradition? For moral objectivism, moral obligations to the entities in the

moral universe (however defined) exist whether or not (focusing, say, just on humans) we have social relations with them. So even in the state of nature, before social or political relations have been established, there are moral constraints on what we may do.

Now one can simply stipulate, of course, that contract theory is to be understood as presupposing moral anti-objectivism, thus leaving Hobbes in triumphant sole possession of the field. But is this really a conceptual insight into the inner logic of contract theory, or is it just a semantic proclamation about how one intends to use terms? Why can't an opponent legitimately reply: "Individuals in the state of nature with no social relations with one another can be conceived of as having no moral ties (under the belief that morality is conventional) or as having moral ties (under the belief that morality is objective). In both cases, we can then ask: how and by what principles would they construct the sociopolitical order? The first variant generates Hobbesian social contract theory, the second variant generates non-Hobbesian social contract theory (Lockean-Kantian). But both are nonetheless examples of contract theory." I wonder, then, if the conceptual bottom line for you is not simply that contract theory presupposes moral conventionalism (i.e. morality as created by the contract), from which everything else follows. But if one rejects this assumption, or interpretation, then you get a different picture of what contract theory can include.

And I think this point is also pertinent for how we are respectively conceiving of rights. I was thinking of rights in the standard sense of norms which generate corresponding duties. So if A has a right to X, then B has a duty to respect A's right to X. Rights in this sense can be reciprocally coordinated with one another in a consistent normative system. Hobbes's "right of nature," by contrast, isn't a right in this sense, but an unconstrained liberty, since by its very character other Hobbesian individuals in the state of nature have no obligations to respect it. It's not possible to develop an internally consistent normative system of such rights, since everyone has the right to do whatever he judges necessary to survive, with no reciprocal duties on the part of others. So when I said rights were not basic for Hobbes, it's because I was thinking of rights thus conceived, which are the most important kind for normative political theory. To cite the standard philosophical judgment, equality for Hobbes is really equality of "threat advantage" (we can all threaten one another equally), not equality of moral status. So the foundation is really power, not normative entitlement (and thus rights in the standard sense).

Correspondingly, I don't see Hobbesian individuals in the state of nature as "owning themselves" if this is taken to mean (as I think it would be) having property rights over themselves. Property rights by

definition (I don't think I'm begging the question here) are rights which others have duties to respect. But in the Hobbesian state of nature, as you point out yourself, everybody has the right to everything. So just as people have possessions rather than property (external or non-external goods to which they're morally entitled, and which others must respect), they possess rather than own themselves. Again, it's a question of power, not right. I have this dead deer in my hut that I've killed, in the process mixing my labor with it. But I have no Lockean right to it, and if you're stronger than I am and you take it, you're within your rights to do so – it's not “stealing.” Similarly, if you decide that it's worth your while to enslave me and force me to work for you, I cannot complain that you're violating my right of self-ownership in doing so, since your right to everything makes your actions legitimate. Just as my right to everything makes it legitimate for me to throw off my chains one night and kill or try to enslave you in turn. So as I said: this kind of “right” can't be incorporated into a consistent normative system. It's not until the transfer of this peculiar “right” by the contract, and the accompanying constraints of obligation are thereby produced, that rights in the familiar normative sense appear. (And even then, as numerous commentators over the years have pointed out, the question remains of whether Hobbes can really claim we're now obliged to keep the agreement under circumstances where we can get away with breaking it.)

CP I certainly did not intend to suggest either that Hobbes is the “paradigmatic contract theorist” or that contractarianism is “coextensive with contract theory.” I do not subscribe to either argument. I have always seen Locke, Kant, Rousseau, etc. as part of the contract tradition, and still do – they are all theorists of an original contract, although Rousseau criticizes the version now taken as standard – and I have analyzed their political theories in that light. My argument in *The Sexual Contract*, as I stated earlier, is that if we want to understand why it is possible to see a central institution, such as employment, as free rather than based in subordination (why wage labor is put on the other side of a divide from unfree labor), then an appreciation of the logic of contract found in Hobbes, and running through contractarianism, is vital.

If you asked me which theorist is the “paradigmatic” theorist of an original contract my reply would be that it is Locke. This is because his state of nature is explicitly social and constrained by the laws of nature, and he makes a series of theoretical moves that cast relations that we now take for granted in (what appears as) an eminently reasonable form. For example, I teased out what he does with the separation between “paternal” and “political” (private and public) power and how

that glosses over the subordination of wives. Contemporary contract theorists have ignored the latter because they see only the results of Locke's strategy, such as the division between private and public. The results fit in so well with existing intuitions, so they fail to scrutinize what he actually does and the effects of his maneuvers. As I wrote in my book "the classics are thus read in the light of the construction of modern civil society in the texts themselves" (Pateman 1988: 221).

The problem with which the classic theorists had to grapple, that the premise of individual freedom and equality threw all authority relations into question, and the theoretical paths they took to avoid the full implications of their own premise, are rarely discussed. Contemporary theorists (implicitly) draw back at similar points to their predecessors and so there is little sign that they want to confront the full significance of putting individual freedom and equality, or social life as a voluntary scheme, at the center of their arguments. As you put it, arguments such as ours raise questions they should feel "philosophically obligated to answer." But they do not. If they did, then questions about structural change would have been addressed long ago rather than attention being focused on the contours of moral reasoning and hypothetical agreements.

Incidentally, this is another reason why I disagree with you about non-ideal contract theory. The crucial question is how hegemony can be dislodged. As I commented at the beginning of our dialogue, spending some time thinking about the history of feminist political thought has brought me to the conclusion that even the most logical and compelling theoretical arguments will be shoved under the carpet if they are too inconvenient. From at least 1700, feminist thinkers have exposed the contradictions and evasions in theorists such as Locke. But who listened? Who changed their arguments because of it? The sharpest critic of Locke on natural freedom, Mary Astell (an absolutist), was completely lost from view and has only been discussed in very recent years. Of the famous philosophers, i.e. those routinely taught in universities, John Stuart Mill listened but his feminist arguments were regarded as an embarrassment until relatively recently; and how often are they now treated as an integral part of his work in standard commentaries? Quite apart from the fact that most people do not want to change a theoretical framework which they have claimed for their own, the hegemony is not just philosophical. The theoretical arguments have helped form institutions and power structures and it is hard to dislodge power by argument alone, which does not mean that we should not keep trying by a range of theoretical means – even reworked contract theory!

But to get back to Hobbes, let me reiterate that I am not suggesting that contract theory is really contractarianism. Contractarianism is but

one form, albeit an especially revealing one, of contract theory. Therefore, I certainly do not want to argue that all contract theory has to begin by assuming that individuals are isolated atoms with no relations between them – that is anthropological and sociological nonsense and my book on political obligation was, in part, an extended argument against that view. However, it is necessary, I would insist, to look at the implications of such abstract individualism to appreciate the logic of a conception of society as nothing but contract, all the way down. Hobbes lays bare aspects of contract theory that are usually covered over. That is one reason that he is so important. The other is that he begins from the assumption that the sexes are equal in the state of nature; indeed, as mothers women are lords.

As far as Hobbes's state of nature is concerned, my interpretation of the laws of nature (morality), which are part of his picture, is that he cannot do without them. By this I mean that certain social and moral qualities that are imaginatively abstracted away from the "individual" nonetheless have to be presupposed or the transition to civil society is not possible. In order to conclude the original pact, individuals have to understand what "contracting" means or there could be no contract; that is, they have to understand Hobbes's third law of nature. Similarly, they have to understand "peace" and what the laws of nature mean or no morality or society would be possible at all.

Now, Hobbes says that in the state of nature the laws apply only *in foro interno*; this is necessarily the case given his portrayal of individuals and individual judgment. The laws cannot be acted upon with safety in the state of nature but nonetheless individuals understand them. The laws provide for mutual aid and forbearance, the fundamental conceptual requirement if "social" life is to exist. If there is no implicit understanding of the meaning of the laws (of what mutual aid and forbearance entails) then (civil) society is impossible. Another way of making this point is that a contract between two individuals is not possible without the practice of contract, albeit that the practice is only implicit in Hobbes's natural condition. Yet another formulation is that the noncontractual bases of contract are always taken for granted. So, in that sense, my reading of Hobbes is that morality and society both are and are not created by the original contract.

In my book on political obligation I drew a distinction between "ought" and "obligation" and argued that the laws of nature set out what we ought to do. In Hobbes's state of nature it would be virtually impossible for individuals to assume an obligation because it would always be to their disadvantage to "act second" (strictly, for Hobbes, a "contract," unlike a covenant, is a simultaneous exchange and so is possible). I would respond to the objection that you raise at the end of your

previous remarks as follows: in civil society, as the laws of nature dictate, an obligation, if entered into, should be kept. The civil law can help enforce (some) obligations. The problem arises if individuals are seen in the manner of contractarianism and all relations are presumed to be constituted by contract. The end of each agreement will then always be as important as the beginning because something better may offer itself. In addition, the temptation will always be to break a contract if it appears advantageous and is likely to go unpunished. Thus, as theorists such as Hegel and Durkheim have taught us (a lesson ignored by neoliberals), a society modelled after the image of contract undercuts the conditions for its own existence and Leviathan thus always waits in the wings.

At a general level, I do not think we disagree very much about rights. I took your point about Hobbes and rights too literally, but the points I have just made can be extended to rights in Hobbes's state of nature. As you state, the right to all things is not a reciprocal right, but rights in the latter sense are embodied in his laws of nature. You are correct that, strictly, property cannot exist in Hobbes's natural condition (as he is well aware) so I have no quarrel at all with the formulation that in the state of nature individuals possess themselves. Indeed, that brings us back to C. B. Macpherson's famous characterization, the "possessive individual." Macpherson is not very fashionable today, but I learnt a great deal from his interpretation of Hobbes and Locke.

CM Like Macpherson, we both have obvious sympathies with the left (or, as the joke has it, what's left of the left). So if you think of yourself as a political progressive today, what do you do? Well, one reaction is to aim at more realizable goals, given the prevailing climate. Though I don't use the phrase in *The Racial Contract*, I've been arguing in more recent work for a "non-white-supremacist capitalism." In other words, if capitalism limits our horizons, then at least let's have a capitalism that lives up to its "society open to talents" advertising. Obviously I'm making several assumptions here. One is that white supremacy can be conceptually and (more importantly) causally separated from capitalism. Another is that non-white-supremacist capitalism would be morally preferable to, more just than, white-supremacist capitalism. On the first, it's often pointed out to me by people on the left in campus or conference audiences where I'm speaking – or often claimed, I should say – that capitalism caused racism and white supremacy in the first place. And my response is that even if that's historically true (and I'm certainly sympathetic to the claim), it doesn't follow that in the present period sufficiently powerful material forces can't be marshalled to struggle for a nonracial capitalist order now. On the second, it's sometimes

been argued to me that there'd be no difference. And I think that's just false – I think that racist capitalism has peculiar features, peculiar oppressions, of its own, and that eliminating them would represent real moral progress. Note that these objectors' position implies that the black civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s would not have been worth supporting by the white left, since for the most part they weren't anticapitalist in character but antisegregation, anti-Jim Crow, anti-white-supremacy. They were struggles for equal inclusion in the polity and the capitalist economy.

So you'll recognize the position – it's basically the racial equivalent of the liberal feminist argument. That would be my first response to you, that while I agree completely that commodification has spread everywhere, to areas Marx would never have dreamed possible, isn't it still better in a market, property-dominated society to have property not distributed in such a racially inequitable way?

CP I agree that it is better to have a racially equitable distribution of property, just as it would be better for women to have an equitable share of global property, wealth, and income. But why must we let (a certain form of) capitalism limit our horizons? In practice, a neoliberal form of capitalism has gained great power but I do not see why we should merely accept that power when we are doing political theory and thinking about "the good society." This is why I have been challenging the widespread assumption that the institution of employment, which, like David Ellerman, I have come to see as the lynchpin of capitalism, is a necessary part of democracy. Even in practice, prevailing economic doctrines are being challenged, especially in Latin America, and also by many grass-roots movements around the world. I agree that we should argue for a racially – and sexually – equitable property distribution but I disagree that this precludes keeping much broader goals in mind at the same time. There are different ways of working toward a change in the distribution of resources and some ways of going about it may be conducive to more than one political aim, as I have argued elsewhere, for example about a basic income for all citizens.

CM You're right, of course, that one can be an activist, or a theorist (what "activism" comes to for most academics), on more than one front. In a classic left framework, that would have been negotiating the relationship between reform and revolution. So struggling for reforms within the system wouldn't necessarily rule out struggling against the system itself. But I guess for me the global defeat of the socialist project (in the Marxist sense) has been so overwhelming that I'm just pretty dubious about the current possibilities for antisystemic change of that

kind. What's been happening in Latin America has indeed been inspiring, and I'm all for it. But that's social democracy, left-liberalism, not socialism in the classic sense of working-class ownership of the means of production. If that's what you mean by "socialism," then fine, I'm happy to support such redistributivist programs, and to endorse basic-income arguments. We certainly have a lot of models for that, for example in Western European social democracy. What we don't have are models for an economically functioning and politically attractive postcapitalist socioeconomic order.

As you know, there are many people formerly on the orthodox left who concluded that the collapse of state socialism did indeed vindicate the original criticisms of the Austrian school, i.e. that market mechanisms are crucial for informational reasons. Hence the work in recent years on trying to work out viable models of market socialism. But apart from the intrinsic problems of modeling such an alternative, there are also the extrinsic problems of trying to win over a population thoroughly socialized (at least in this country) to associate anything even slightly left with totalitarianism, the antichrist, etc. After all, "liberal" was successfully transformed by the right into a term of invective decades ago. So if people run scared of liberalism – milquetoast, boring, (once) respectable liberalism – how are you going to convince them to be socialists?

CP If only I had an answer to your last question – although I'm doubtful that it is very fruitful to spend time arguing about the meaning of "socialism" and "liberalism" at this point. Concrete proposals and alternative theoretical directions are needed; the labels are less important. Prospects might look bleak but there is an enormous amount of questioning of and opposition to the neoliberal agenda, and more information is available about inequalities, injustices, and exploitation than ever before. One of the difficulties is that old-established parties and institutions in the rich countries are in decline and so the opposition remains diffuse. And since the "war on terror," time has to be devoted to defending some very basic requirements of democracy. Civil liberties are under threat – who would have thought that we would be in a position where the case has to be made against the use of torture, detention without due process and trial, and secret jails? – anti-Arab racism has been given a veneer of respectability, and accountability is in tatters. Mercenaries (aka private contractors), subject neither to military nor Iraqi law, are part of the occupation of Iraq, and they appeared on the streets of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.

My view is that if an alternative is to be developed some new ideas, and some old ideas brushed up and renewed, are called for about some

very central matters, one reason that I am interested in basic income. For example, never has so much been heard about elections and democracy. But, given all the obvious problems with elections in the richest as well as poor countries, why not introduce experiments with decision-making bodies chosen by lot (proper random sample) instead of election? Again, political theorists have paid scant attention to the question of corporations, which are legal "persons" in the United States (another problem that needs tackling), and new thinking about ways to break down and democratize the rapidly expanding, vast reach of corporate power, including the corporatized media, is urgently needed. So much of vital importance is rarely touched on in democratic theory and, more generally in these dangerous times, political theory needs to be brought down to earth, away from the Higher Theory and focused on our present circumstances.

In *The Racial Contract* you wrote that we need to know "what went wrong in the past, is going wrong now, and is likely to *continue* to go wrong in the future if we do not guard against it" (p. 92). To raise the question of what went wrong in the past is not something that is always welcomed. Without much more knowledge of the history of the sexual and racial contracts than is commonly provided it is all the harder to map out potentially democratic paths for the future. We made a start on this in our two books, and two of my contributions to this volume try to take this further. All we can hope is that our new chapters make a contribution to the task of constructing an alternative.

CM Well, whatever else we may disagree on, we can certainly agree on that.

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